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In teaching Russian, before anything else, we must inculcate
love.... We must rear interest and love for the Russian language
and the Russian people.'
I love the language of those lullabies
And tales that I heard in childhood
But it told of boundless distances and all.
A fellow citizen gave to me in friendship
Another language.
I went across the mountain with him
To perceive the grandeur of the Motherland.
Then was the language mighty, in which
Il'ich2 wrote and spoke.
With all my heart, son of a mountaineer, I came
To consider that great language as my own.'
All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than
others.4
INTRODUCTION
With over five thousand languages and dialects in the world5 and ap-
proximately two hundred countries,' most nations are home to a large
1. ISABELLE KREINDLER, THE CHANGING STATUS OF RUSSIAN IN THE SOvIET UNION 32
(Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, Soviet and E. Eur. Research Ctr., Research Paper No. 37, 1979)
(quoting instructions to Russian teachers).
2. A respectful reference to Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, using his patronymic.
3. A. Galazov, The Native and Russian Languages in Our Schools, SOvIET EDUC., Oct.
1965, at 46, 46 (unabridged translation of an article appearing in the Soviet publication Norodnoe
obrazovanie, 1965, No. 3) (quoting the Avarian poet Rasul Gamzatov).
4. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMALFARM 112 (1946).
5. See, e.g., Ethnologue Europe (visited Nov. 13, 1997) <http://www.sil.org/ethnologue/
countries> (cataloging more than 6,700 languages spoken in 228 countries). This figure includes
languages spoken by relatively few people. There are 242 languages in the world which are spoken
by at least one million people. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 642-43 (1997).
6. See WHrrAKER'S ALMANAC 777-81 (1997) (cataloging 226 countries and territories).
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number of people whose native language is different from the national lan-
guage.7 Laws on language are therefore very important in most countries of
the world Language, for most of us, is more than just a means of commu-
nication. It is often a part of ethnic heritage and identity and is intertwined
with culture, literature, and even lullabies. 9 Thus, language laws have im-
portant implications for the rights and treatment of linguistic minorities.'0
Linguistic minorities have become a sudden and especially serious
problem in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.
There has been much controversy over the laws that the post-Soviet states
have passed which impose the national language as the official language."
The Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have been at the fore-
front of this controversy because they first confronted the issue of
linguistic minorities and enacted some of the strongest laws to promote
the national languages. 2
Most scholars have focused on the negative effect of these laws on the
linguistic minorities, most significantly, the Russian minority. 3 While
7. For ease of reference, this article refers to the language of the majority of the citizens
of the State as the "national" or "majority" language. It also refers to the national language of
those States that have emerged from an ethnically or geographically based republic, even if at
some time the majority population in that State was Russian. Thus, for example, Kazakh is
referred to as the national language of Kazakhstan.
8. In the United States, for example, there are debates regarding whether English must be
spoken in the workplace. See, e.g., Robert D. King, Should English be the law?, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Apr. 1997, at 55. For an interesting analysis of official English laws in the context of
France's language laws, see Leila Sadat Wexler, Official English, Nationalism and Linguistic
Terror: A French Lesson, 71 WASH. L. REV. 285 (1996). Another well known linguistic contro-
versy exists for French language speakers in Quebec. See generally Leslie Green, Are Language
Rights Fundamental?, 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 639 (1987).
9. For immigrants, native language is also a strong link to the past. See Sonia Bychkov
Green & Ida Bychkov, Bilingualism in Immigrant Children: A Preliminary Essay, 72 J. OF
JEWISH COMMUNAL SERVICE 339, 340 (1996). At the same time, the new language is an im-
portant part of their future. See Chae-kun Yu, The Correlates of Cultural Assimilation of Korean
Immigrants in the United States, in THE KOREAN DIASPORA: HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
STUDIES OF KOREAN IMMIGRATION AND ASSIMILATION IN NORTH AMERICA 167, 173
(Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1977) (noting that "[blecause language is the symbol of culture and a
medium through which culture is transmitted, language proficiency is absolutely essential for
assimilation into a host society").
10. For an excellent discussion of state policies on language and the use of human rights in
protecting linguistic minorities, see generally FERNAND DE VARENNES, LANGUAGE, MI-
NORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1996). For background and general discussion of minority
issues in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, see Rein Mullerson, Minorities in Eastern
Europe and the Former USSR: Problems, Tendencies and Protection, 56 MODERN L. REV. 793
(1993).
11. These laws have taken various forms. See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part I.
13. See, e.g., Marc Holzapfel, Note, The Implications of Human Rights Abuses Currently
Occurring in The Baltic States Against the Ethnic Russian National Minority, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L
L. 329 (1996) (arguing that the laws in the Baltic states discriminate against the Russian minor-
ity in those States and should be at least partially amended).
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identifying the potentially discriminatory effects of these laws is impor-
tant, it leaves unanswered the questions of why the laws were enacted and
whether they are necessary to serve the legitimate goals of the State.' To
answer these questions, we must examine these laws in their historical
context and as a reaction to the language laws that existed under the
Communist system.'5 This article argues that the laws for promotion of
the national languages are a legitimate means for the Baltic states to es-
tablish their cultural independence from Russia and the former Soviet
Union.
The article is organized in three sections. Part I examines the current
language laws in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia and reviews and analyzes
the effect that the laws have had on the States and on their minority
populations. Part I then reviews the official justification for the current
laws: to reverse the Soviet policy of Russification.
Part II examines the history of language policies in the former USSR.
It begins by reviewing the Tzarist legacy and the language policies of the
early Communist leaders who did not intend the nationwide spread of
Russian. An assessment of Nikita Khrushchev's language theories and
laws follows, focusing especially on his policy of "sliianie"'6 and the re-
sults thereof. Part II also discusses the results of Khrushchev's policies,
specifically the increased status of Russian and the responses of Russian
and non-Russian groups to these policies. Part II concludes with an ex-
amination of language laws of the post-Khrushchev Soviet leaders.
Part III then evaluates the language laws of the Baltic states to see if
the justifications offered by the States have merit. It argues that the laws
are justified for three reasons. First, when properly viewed in their his-
torical context, the laws are a necessary response to Soviet language laws,
especially those that promoted Russification. Part II asserts that the laws
are a means of reclaiming the national languages. Second, though the
laws may have some discriminatory effect, they do not violate interna-
14. This formulation intentionally parallels equal protection scrutiny, which asks whether a
law is justified by a sufficiently strong state interest and is closely tailored to serve that interest.
15. Of course, it is shortsighted to analyze the laws of the post-Soviet states or the USSR
without understanding Russian history. See, e.g., Molly Warner Lien, Red Star Trek.- Seeking a
Role for Constitutional Law in Soviet Disunion, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 41 (1994) (analyzing the
prospects for rule of law in Russia in the context of Russian history). This article limits itself to
only a brief discussion of pre-Soviet history. See infra text accompanying notes 134-137. See
also ANATOL LIEVEN, THE BALTIC REVOLUTION: ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA AND THE
PATH TO INDEPENDENCE (2d ed. 1994) (noting that the history of the Baltic states is crucial in
understanding their laws but arguing that the Baltic states should grant more collective rights to
their Russian minorities).
16. This Russian word literally means "merging." In the context of language laws, it may
also be translated more generally as "forced assimilation." Throughout the article, all transla-
tions are mine unless noted otherwise.
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tional law. Third, the Baltic laws are not unique among the post-Soviet
states. All of the newly independent states have, to varying degrees, at-
tempted to regain their cultural and linguistic independence by enacting
laws to promote the national language.
The article concludes by examining the lessons learned from Khrush-
chev's language policy and by examining why language laws are
important. One of the great ironies of the Soviet legacy is that Khrush-
chev, viewed by many as a reformer, changed Soviet language policy to
the point where Russification became the primary focus. This has both
practical and theoretical relevance for the post-Soviet states. On a theo-
retical level, the lessons of Khrushchev's reign are valuable for
understanding whether liberal language laws are possible. On a practical
level, the policy of Russification led to the loss of native languages and
the laws adopted by the post-Soviet states are a necessary response to that
loss.
I. LANGUAGE LAWS IN THE POST-SOVIET BALTIC STATES
In 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The fifteen republics be-
came independent states and began to develop their own constitutions,
laws, and legal procedures. Of the post-Soviet states, the three Baltic
countries have adopted the most interesting-and the most controver-
sial-laws on language.'
7
Laws governing language take different forms: there are constitu-
tional provisions that declare what is the official language of the State,"
there are specific laws on language use in different areas of life, 9 and
there are laws on citizenship requirements which include knowledge of
the official language.0 This section examines both citizenship and lan-
17. None of the Baltic states have Russian as the national language In fact, the Latvians,
Lithuanians and Estonians are themselves linguistically different. Estonian is part of the Finno-
Ugric group of languages which makes it similar to Finnish and Hungarian. See Susan E. Him-
mer, The Achievement of Independence in the Baltic States and Its Justifications, 6 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 253, 255-56 (1992). Latvian and Lithuanian are both from the Indo-European
Baltic family of languages but are very different from each other. See ROMUALD J. MISIUNAS &
REIN TAAGEPERA, THE BALTIC STATES: YEARS OF DEPENDENCE 1940-1980, at 1 (1983).
18. See, e.g., LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCuA [Constitution] art. 14 (Lith.), re-
printed and translated in 11 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1994) [hereinafter LITH. CONST.].
19. See, e.g., Law on Language (Feb. 21, 1995) (Est.), translated in MICHAEL GEIS-
TLINGER & AKSEL KIRCH, ESTONIA-A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE ESTONIAN MAJORITY
AND THE RUSSIAN MINORITY 139 (1995) [hereinafter Estonian Language Law].
20. See, e.g., Law on Citizenship, of January 19, 1995 (Est.), [hereinafter Estonian Citizen-
ship Law], translated in CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS: ESTONIA,
LATVIA, LITHUANIA [hereinafter CEELM] (Vratislav Pechota ed., Release 31, Aug. 1995);
Resolution on the Renewal of Republic of Latvia Citizens' Rights and Fundamental Principles
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guage laws in the Baltic states' before proceeding to a discussion of re-
actions to these laws.
A. Language Laws in Newly Independent Lithuania,
Estonia, and Latvia
1. Lithuania
Of the three states, Lithuania has the most liberal laws on citizenship
but, like the other states, has enacted laws clearly designed to promote the
national language.
22
Lithuania's Constitution establishes Lithuanian as the "State lan-
guage" and does not confer secondary status to any other languages." In
the freedoms granted under the Constitution, the freedom to use a foreign
language is not included. 4 Similarly, in the provisions on education, the
Lithuanian Constitution guarantees religious instruction if requested, but
not instruction in a language other than Lithuanian?'
Lithuania's Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners provides that for-
eigners are "equal before the law regardless of their race, skin color, sex,
language ... ,6 However, in the provision of the law that grants various
political freedoms to foreigners, there is the noticeable absence of the
right to communicate in a foreign language.
of Naturalization, of October 15, 1991, translated in CEELM, supra (Release 27, Nov. 1994)
[hereinafter Latvian Citizenship Law]; Law on Lithuanian Citizenship, of December 5, 1991,
translated in CEELM, supra (Release 16, Jan. 1993) [hereinafter Lithuania Citizenship Law]. In
the Baltic states, the laws on citizenship have been at the forefront of the debate because re-
quiring Russians and other minorities to speak the national language before they can become
citizens has had an immediate negative effect on the linguistic minorities.
21. See infra Part III, discussing the language laws of some of the other post-Soviet states.
22. See Lithuanian Citizenship Law, supra note 20, art. 12. See generally Them and Us,
THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 1996. As will be discussed, infra Table 1 and Part III, the liberality
of Lithuania's Citizenship Law may be due in part to Lithuania's relatively small percentage of
Russians.
23. LITH. CONST. art. 14. In contrast, some of the other post-Soviet states have given Rus-
sian the status of a "second official language." See, e.g., KONSTrruTsnA RESPUBLIKI
KAZAKHSTAN [Constitution] art. 7 (Kaz.), reprinted and translated in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1996)
[hereinafter KAz. CONST.] (establishing Kazakh as the official language of Kazakhstan, but
giving Russian "equal grounds" in state and local administrative bodies); infra notes 340-344
and accompanying text.
24. LrrH. CONST. arts. 25-26 (granting, primarily, freedom of expression, thought, con-
science and religion).
25. See id. art. 40.
26. Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners, of September 5, 1991 (Lith.), art. 3, translated
in CEELM, supra note 20 (Release 9, Apr. 1992) (emphasis added).
27. See id. arts. 8, 10, 12. These political freedoms include "freedom of thought, con-
science and religion." lI art. 8.
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Of the three states, Lithuania has applied its citizenship law most lib-
erally. Lithuania instantly granted citizenship to all those present in the
State at the time of independence." The majority of the population in Vil-
nius (the capital of Lithuania) was against granting citizenship to the
"occupiers"' 9 but the State chose to grant citizenship even to Russians in
Lithuania.
The Law on Lithuanian Citizenship grants Lithuanian citizenship
automatically to those people who were citizens of Lithuania on June 15,
1940 and to their descendants." Although that provision is aimed at
Lithuanians specifically, other provisions enable non-descendant Russians
and other minorities to acquire Lithuanian citizenship as well. To become
a citizen, an alien must pass an examination on the Lithuanian language,
have a permanent residence in Lithuania for ten years, have a job or
source of income, and pass an examination on the Lithuanian Constitu-
tion." In accordance with this law, immigrants to Lithuania are given the
opportunity-but are not required-to study the Lithuanian language and
Constitution. 2
2. Estonia
Estonia's Constitution establishes Estonian as the official language.3
Estonia's Law on Language reiterates that Estonian is the state language
and declares every language other than Estonian to be a "foreign lan-
guage.' ' The law promotes the Estonian language by giving every citizen
the right to use Estonian in dealings with governmental and other
"institutions, enterprises and organizations."35
The Estonian Constitution gives parents "the final decision in choos-
ing education for their children" and while it guarantees the "right to
instruction in Estonian," it also states that educational institutions estab-
28. See DE VARENNES, supra note 10, at 244.
29. See Rudolf Bernhardt & Henry Schermers, Lithuanian Law and International Human
Rights Standards, 13 HUM. RTs. L.J. 249, 253 para. 27 (1992) (report to the Parliamentary As-
sembly of the Council of Europe on human rights in Lithuania).
30. Lithuanian Citizenship Law, supra note 20, art. 1. This date is significant because it is
the date of the Soviet occupation of Lithuania.
31. See id. art. 12. Note also that unlike Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania does not explicitly
prohibit citizenship for former members of the Communist party or the KGB. See id. art. 13. But
cf Estonian Citizenship Law, supra note 20, art. 21; Latvian Citizenship Law, supra note 20, art.
3.5.
32. Law on Immigration, of September 1, 1991 (Lith.), art. 7, translated in CEELM, supra
note 20 (Release 15, Dec. 1992).
33. See EESTI VABARIIGI POHISEADUS [Constitution] art. 6 (Est.), reprinted and translated
in 6 CONSTITUTIoNs OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H.
Flanz eds., 1994) [hereinafter EST. CONST.].
34. Estonian Language Law, supra note 19, art. 2(1).
35. Id art. 4(1).
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lished for ethnic minorities "shall choose their own language of instruc-
tion." Article 22 of the Estonian Language Law only allows for the
creation of schools taught in other languages when it is "in accordance
with the needs and possibilities of the Republic. 37 Comments to this law
indicated that this would only be allowed when there was a need to train a
Russian-speaking specialist in a particular field. In fact, the Estonian
Parliament passed a law that would require the upper grades of all secon-
dary schools be taught exclusively in Estonian by the year 2000."9
Like the Lithuanian Constitution, the Estonian Constitution focuses
on the promotion of the Estonian language. It emphasizes the right to use
Estonian in communication and public life.4' However, the Constitution
also protects against discrimination on the basis of language."' The Con-
stitution provides that in areas where the majority language is not
Estonian, "local government authorities may use the language of the ma-
jority of the permanent residents of that locality for internal
communication, to the extent and in accordance with procedures estab-
lished by law."'42 The last part of this provision leaves room for
interpretation. For example, in 1995, the Estonian government rejected
proposals by the heavily Russian cities of Narva and Sillamae to allow
Russian to be used for official documents in those cities.43 The Estonian
government stated that the allowing the use of Russian in local govern-
ment would contravene Estonia's language laws. 44
Estonia's official position is that while the State does actively pro-
mote the use of the Estonian language, it does not tolerate language-based
discrimination. Estonia has stated that "[d]espite a consistent and deliber-
ate Russification policy carried out by Soviet authorities during the
occupation of Estonia, the Government of Estonia wished to reiterate that
36. EST. CONST. art. 37.
37. Estonian Language Law, supra note 19, art. 22. See also Raimo Pekkanen & Hans
Danelius, Human Rights in the Republic of Estonia, 13 HUM. RTS. L.J. 236, 241 para. 56 (1992)
(report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on human rights in Estonia).
38. See id (voicing concerns that such a narrow requirement would restrict the freedom of
education).
39. Estonians, Russians, and the Burden of History, Swiss REV. OF WORLD AFF., Sept. 2,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (also noting, however, that Tallinn's
Education Ministry has stated that this will be impossible to implement).
40. See EST. CONST. art. 51 (stating that "[a]ll persons shall have the right to address state
or local government authorities ... in Estonian . .."); id. art. 52 (mandating that "[tihe official
language of state and local government authorities shall be Estonian").
41. Id. art. 12.
42. Id. art. 52.
43. See Estonia will not give Russian Language Official Status, OMRI Daily Digest, July
19, 1995 (visited Nov. 13, 1997) <http://search.omri.czlbin/omri/acgi$main-search>. Russians




discrimination against Russians or any other ethnic group living in Esto-
nia is constitutionally and legislatively forbidden.
' 45
Estonia's Law on Cultural Autonomy gives very broad protections to
ethnic and linguistic minorities." This law provides that national minori-
ties'7 have the right to preserve their language and to publish in their
ethnic languages." Estonia has also noted that it has increased language
training for non-Estonian speakers.49
In contrast to Lithuania, Estonia has adopted more stringent laws on
citizenship. Estonia also requires that aliens who wish to receive Estonian
citizenship must, inter alia, "have knowledge of the Estonian language."'
The law then elaborates on the requirement, stating that knowledge of the
Estonian language "shall be general knowledge, required for day to day
life, [including] listening comprehension ... conversation ... reading
comprehension ... [and] writing."'" The Citizenship Law grants an ex-
emption to "[a]ny person who has completed basic, secondary or higher
education in the Estonian language. 52
The number of people in Estonia who are not Estonian citizens has
been estimated as over 330,000. 53 Thirty percent of the 1.5 million resi-
dents are Russians.5 Most of these residents are not Estonian citizens.55
Between May 1992 and May 1996, approximately 75,000 Russian resi-
dents of Estonia became Estonian citizens.5' At the same time,
approximately 100,000 Russians applied for and received Russian pass-
ports from Moscow's embassy in Tallinn. 7 This decreased the number of
"stateless" ' persons in Estonia, but still leaves a large percentage of the
45. Comments by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia on the Recommendations sub-
mitted by H.E. Mr Max van der Stoel, CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 14
HUM. RTs. L.J. 221,221 (1993) [hereinafter Estonian CSCE Comments].
46. Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities (Oct. 26, 1993) (Est.), translated in
GEISTLINGER & KIRCH, supra note 19, at 123.
47. This includes German, Russian, Swedish and Jewish minorities and ethnic groups of
more than three thousand persons. See id art. 2(2).
48. Id. arts. 4-5.
49. See Estonian CSCE Comments, supra note 45, at 222.
50. Estonian Citizenship Law, supra note 20, art. 6(3).
51. Id. art. 8.
52. Id. art. 8(5).
53. See Estonians, Russians, and the Burden of History, supra note 39.
54. See infra Table 1.
55. See International Body Tells Estonia to Lower Citizenship Hurdle, DEUTSCHE PRESS-
AGENTUR, Dec. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
56. See Estonians, Russians, and the Burden of History, supra note 39.
57. See id. This number is an estimate because Russian authorities do not make public the
names of the Russian residents who have opted for Russian citizenship. See id.
58. This refers to people who do not have Estonian citizenship and who do not have Rus-
sian citizenship, thus making them, effectively, not citizens of any state. This is possible because
people who had been citizens of the Soviet Union did not automatically become Russian citi-
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Russian population without citizenship. Estonia has, however, supported
the recommendation of the Conference on Security Co-Operation in
Europe (CSCE) High Commissioner for Minorities of increased dialogue
with the minority population and recognized the importance of decreasing
the number of stateless people in Estonia. 9
In 1997, Estonia became the first post-Soviet State to stop recogniz-
ing Soviet passports. ° Most Russians in Estonia were issued "alien
passports" which do not confer rights of citizenship, but do give the hold-
ers the right to vote in local elections."' There is a concern that if the trend
of Russians applying for Russian citizenship continues, Estonia will have
a sizable minority population of permanent residents."
3. Latvia
Like Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia has passed laws to strengthen and
advance the Latvian language and has made Latvian its official state lan-
guage.63 The government of Latvia has promoted the teaching of Latvian
in the various school levels and developed programs to further the teach-
ing of Latvian." Latvia has allowed for non-Latvian education, especially
in places like Riga where Latvian students are in the minority.65 At the
same time, however, Latvia has recently tightened its Latvian language
requirements in education and other areas of public life.
6
The Latvian citizenship law is stricter than those in Estonia and
Lithuania.67 It requires applicants to have lived in Latvia at least sixteen
zens when the Soviet Union dissolved, nor did they automatically become citizens of the State
where they were living (with some exceptions-e.g. Lithuania, discussed supra text accompa-
nying notes 22-32). But even in Lithuania, the State needed to officially grant new Lithuanian
citizenship.
59. See Estonian CSCE Comments, supra note 45, at 221.
60. See Kristpher Rikken, Soviet Passports Become Invalid in Estonia, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, May 15, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
61. Estonians, Russians, and the Burden of History, supra note 39.
62. See id.
63. See DE VARENNES, supra note 10, at 161 (citing Article 18, Language Law of the Re-
public of Latvia, Mar. 31, 1992); see also id. at 98 (noting provisions in legislation that make
Latvian the "privileged" language in Latvian civil affairs).
64. See Latvija Human Development Report 1996 (visited Nov. 13, 1997) <http://www.
undp.riga.lv/hdrs/engl96/chap4e.html> (Chapter 4 of the United Nations Development Report,
addressing the educational system in Latvia).
65. Id.
66. See Latvia: Press Digest, Reuter Textline: Reuter News Service-CIS and Eastern
Europe, June 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
67. See Adrian Bridge, Latvian Law will Restrict Russians, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON),
Nov. 27, 1993, available in 1993 WL 10896899. Before the law was passed, the Latvian par-
liament considered at least five different draft citizenship laws which differed in severity from
immediate and unconditional citizenship for all residents to a permanent bar on the number of
ethnic Russians who entered Latvia after 1940. See id. In Latvia, citizenship is important be-
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years, to swear an oath of loyalty to Latvia, and to pass a language test
which requires that the applicant must have "learned the Latvian at a con-
versational level." 
In Latvia, however, approximately 740,000 people (one third of the
population) are not citizens and still hold the old Soviet passport.69
B. Reactions to the New Language Laws: Opposition,
Ethnic Conflict, and Russian Flight
Criticisms of the current laws have come from academics"0 and the
international community. The main concern is with potential human
rights abuses; there have also been warnings of military conflict if Russia
should decide to actively enforce the rights of its people." Russia itself
has been the strongest opponent of the laws.72 The number of Russians
who have been affected by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the new
language laws is very high. Twenty-five million ethnic Russians-or one
in every six Russians-now lives outside the Russian Federation.7' As
many as twenty million Russians live in former Soviet republics.7'
Russia claims that the Latvian and Estonian language laws discrimi-
nate against the Russian minority in those states," and has recommended
that Latvia and Estonia follow Lithuania's example and grant citizenship
to all people who were residents at the time of independence.76 Russia's
cause only citizens enjoy the rights of political activity as well as the right to own land, and the
freedom to reside in and return to Latvia. See Jan De Meyer & Christos Rozakis, Human Rights
in the Republic of Latvia, 13 HUM. RTs. L.J. 244, 245 (1992) (report to the Parliamentary As-
sembly of the Council of Europe on human rights in Latvia).
68. Latvian Citizenship Law, supra note 20, art. 3. Latvia later amended its citizenship law
to eliminate a quota system which had allowed only two thousand aliens a year to become Lat-
vian citizens. See Steven Erlanger, Latvia Amends Harsh Citizenship Law That Angered Russia,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24,1994, at A3.
69. See Reinhard Krumm, Russians in Latvia-Neither Stateless nor Citizens, DEUSTCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 13, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
70. See, e.g., Holzapfel, supra note 13.
71. See Doyle McManus, Christopher Prods Baltics on Behalf of Their Minority Russians,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1993, at A13.
72. See generally Aryeh Neier, Watching Rights, THE NATION, Feb. 14, 1994, at 187.
73. See Sonni Efron, Becoming Strangers in Their Homeland, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1993, at
H2.
74. See Republics Lash Russian Vow of Ethnic Solidarity, THE EDMONTON JOURNAL, Nov.
26, 1993, available in 1993 WL 8377529.
75. See Andras Fehervary, Citizenship, Statelessness and Human Rights: Recent Develop-
ments in the Baltic States, 5 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 392, 394 (1993); Foreign Ministry Press
Briefing, OFFICIAL KREMLIN INT'L NEws BROADCAST, Feb. 13, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
76. See Foreign Ministry Press Briefing, supra note 75.
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anger at Estonia's language laws has been particularly intense," causing
Russian commentators to describe Estonia as "Russia's number one en-
emy."' Russia believes that the language laws in Estonia pose the chief
barrier to the improvement of inter-ethnic relations.7 Russians in Estonia
perceive the Estonian policy as an attempt to exclude Russians.' ° They
feel that they are discriminated against and repressed.81
These perceptions of repression in Narva and northeast Estonia are
strongly exacerbated by economic disparities between Estonians and Rus-
sians. Estonia's economic achievement since its independence has been
widely noted, 2 as it leads the Baltics in economic development.83 How-
ever, in heavily Russian northeast Estonia, the economic situation is
worse than in other parts of Estonia, with unemployment being estimated
at 34.6 percent.M Many Russian-speaking workers have lost their jobs be-
cause of new laws requiring varying degrees of fluency for various jobs."
Some of the Russians in Lithuania who have lost positions of power due
to the end of Soviet influence have lodged complaints of discrimination.
The expressions of Russian rage and economic disparity have not
fallen on deaf ears in the international community. The UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees has echoed Russia's concern, voicing his concern
77. See generally Honoured Enemy, THE ECONOMIST, May 4, 1996, at 46. Russia's con-
flicts with Estonia have also revolved around border issues and Estonia's lack of deference to
Russia. See id.
78. Id. When asked how he felt about that description, Mart Helme, Estonia's ambassador
to Moscow, replied, "I think it is a very great honour... for a country as tiny as Estonia." Id.
79. See Estonian CSCE Comments, supra note 45, at 223.
80. See, e.g., Estonians, Russians, and the Burden of History, supra note 39 (noting a
statement by an official of the Russians' United People's Party in Estonia that "the Estonians
would be happiest if they could awaken one morning to find all the Russians gone"). Some
anecdotal evidence reveals that Estonians are critical of Russia but not its people. See, e.g., Mi-
chael Specter, Estonians Cast a Wary Eye on Russian Election, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1996, at
A3 (" 'We like Russians,' said Lauri Laivre, 23, an economics student at Tartu University, who
said his father was sent to a prison camp in 1949 by Stalin for being an Estonian nationalist. 'It
is Russia that we hate.' ").
81. See, e.g., Estonians, Russians, and the Burden of History, supra note 39; Specter, supra
note 80.
82. See, e.g., Cord Meyer, Estonia's Critical Role in Europe, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The head of the World Bank's Baltic Office
stated in 1996, "we consider Estonia very much an example of good policy and of how the gov-
ernment can create an environment attracting lots of investment." Id.
83. See Estonians, Russians, and the Burden of History, supra note 39.
84. See Gerald Nadler, Russians Feel Alone in Estonia; Ethnic Minority Fearful of Future,
WASH. TIMES, June 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
85. See Fred Hiatt, Narva, Estonia: Spark in an Ethnic inderbox, WASH. POST, Oct. 9,
1993, at A23 (reporting that the firings occurred in positions as diverse as cashiers in bakeries,
waitresses, and postal clerks).
86. See Bernhardt & Schermers, supra note 29, at 254 para. 37.
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over the plight of ethnic Russians in the Baltics." In 1993, former Secre-
tary of State Warren Christopher called upon the governments of the three
Baltic states to give better treatment to their Russian minorities."
The international community is interested in the situation because of
concerns about serious ethnic conflict. For example, the Estonian town of
Narva, located 150 miles from the Estonian capital of Tallinn, threatens to
erupt. 9 The, eighty thousand residents of Narva are mostly ethnic
Russians. 9 These Russians claim that the Estonian laws disenfranchise
them. Furthermore, they claim that the language laws foreclose hopes of
attaining citizenship because of the -harsh procedures. Due to these
concerns, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has proclaimed
Narva to be "one of the most serious challenges to European stability."9'
These ethnic "hot-spots" have increased fears of military intervention.
Russia once had more than one hundred thousand troops in the Baltics.92
By 1993 it had withdrawn its troops from Lithuania93 and by 1994, Russia
had withdrawn all troops from Estonia and Latvia/' However, Yeltsin had
conditioned the withdrawal of Russian troops on the Baltics' protection of
the Russian minority.9 With the troops gone, Yeltsin lacks leverage.
While it is unlikely Yeltsin would resort to force to protect the ethnic
Russians, many fear that pro-Russian sentiment could lead to the rise of
ultra-nationalist leaders (like Vladimir Zhirinovsky) who could resort to
military force to protect the Russians in the Baltic states.9 These Russian
nationalists demand that the Baltic governments no longer treat Russians
in the former republics as second-class citizens.9
Russia has not exercised subtlety in its assessments of the potential
for violence, noting that "[t]here can't be military security when hundreds
of thousands of people who make up an ethnic minority in some countries
87. See Tom Hundley, Stateless in the Baltics: Russians are New Refugees, CHI. TRM.,
Nov. 26, 1994, at 12.
88. See McManus, supra note 71.
89. See Hiatt, supra note 85.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See McManus, supra note 71.
93. See id. This may be due to the fact that the largest number of troops had always been in
Latvia, which was also where the Soviet Baltic fleet was headquartered and where many retired
Russian naval officers had settled. See id.
94. See Honoured Enemy, supra note 77.
95. See Efron, supra note 73.
96. See generally Specter, supra note 80. See also Jonathan Sunley, Moldova Syndrome:
Restoring Russian Hegemony, BUDAPEST SUN, Mar. 17, 1994, available in 1994 WL 9504116.
97. See Gidon Gottlieb, Nations without States, FOREIGN AFFAiRS, May 1, 1994, at 100.
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of the region feel insecure and uncomfortable."98 However, Russia's lim-
ited international resources and the universal international censure that
would follow such an act makes the threat of reannexation very unlikely.99
The aggregation of ethnic discrimination, economic disenfranchise-
ment, and the potential for violent conflict have caused the Russians (and
other ethnic groups) to flee the new states, most of them going to Rus-
sia.'l ° In a cruel irony, this has added to the tension between Russia and its
Baltic neighbors. Russia has retaliated by cracking down on its foreign
residents, including deporting thousands of people from other regions.' °'
In addition, refugees are not permitted to resettle in Moscow or St. Pe-
tersburg due to housing shortages in those cities. '°
C. Justifications for the Laws
The Baltic states have justified the laws by arguing that they are a
necessary and legitimate assertion of state power to counteract a legacy of
Russification. In fact, the Baltic states' demand for independence from the
USSR was closely tied to fears that Soviet control would extend the loss
of their language and culture.' 3 Therefore, the new language and citizen-
ship laws embrace "evolving concepts of national identity."" For
example, Lithuania's Constitution even focuses on the preservation of the
language in its preamble which notes that "[t]he Lithuanian Nation ...
[has] preserved its spirit, native language, writing, and customs .... "'0'
Latvia has also justified its national language laws with appeals to
national identity, arguing that:
98. Foreign Ministry Press Briefing, supra note 75 (statement by Vadim Borisovich Lukov
of Russia's Foreign Ministry, expressing the need for bilateral dialogue between Russia and
Estonia on the question of security).
99. However, one fact that makes it slightly more plausible is that, unlike most of other
former Soviet republics, the three Baltic states have not joined the Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States (CIS) and thus have weaker political and economic ties to Russia. See Martin Sieff,
Smallest Baltic Nation Stands Tallest; Independent Estonia is Thriving, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 2,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
100. See generally Refugees Pour Into Russia from 'Near Abroad,' CURRENT DIGEST OF
THE POST-SOvIET PRESS, June 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. The
1994 estimate from Russia's Federal Migration Service was that there were close to 1.5 million
refugees in Russia. See id.
101. See Celestine Bohlen, Russia's Ethnic Tapestry is Threaded through with Bigotry,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,1994, at E5.
102. See Efron, supra note 73.
103. See King, supra note 8.
104. See Prepared Statement of Arthur C. Helton, Director of Migration Programs Open
Society Institute Before the House International Relations Committee International Operations
and Human Rights Subcommittee, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, May 22, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Statement ofArthur C. Helton].
105. LITH. CONST. preamble (emphasis added).
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[O]ver the half-century of Soviet occupation, and the strenuous
Russification policy, whereby now only less than one-fourth of
non-Latvians living in this country speak the language, according
to linguists, the Latvian language had reach the second stage of
language extinction ... Although [as a result of the language
laws] a decisive historical shift to the acceptance of Latvian is
well underway, the situation is still precarious; at least the threat
of extinction of the Latvian language has receded.',
In order to assess whether these justifications are valid, it is necessary to
examine the history of Soviet language policy and whether its effects
were truly detrimental to Baltic ethnic identity.
II. HISTORY OF LANGUAGE LAWS IN THE USSR
A. The Multilingual USSR
Language policy was one of the most important issues in the multi-
national and multilingual Soviet Union. According to some scholars,
Soviet language policy oscillated between favoring the minority lan-
guages and attempting to increase the influence of Russian °" Others note
that language theory, "whether as the generator of language policy or only
as its excuse" is significant in the policy setting, and that policy and the-
ory have been changing away from Lenin's original position on
languages."' It is important to examine the history of the language laws in
order to understand exactly how they changed and what was done to give
Russian its status in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's policies are signifi-
cant in this regard because it was Khrushchev who made strides away
from the original "national in form, socialist in content" position es-
poused by the early Communist leaders."°
Prior to its dissolution, the Soviet Union was a multinational and
multilingual country which used a largely ethno-linguistic basis for the
territorial and administrative structure and distribution."" It contained over
102 national groups speaking, by some estimates, as many as 140 differ-
ent languages."' The Soviet government structured the State so that most
106. History, Language, Identity and Culture of Latvia (visited Oct. 15, 1997)
<http'//www.mta.bkc.lv/pub/history.htm#Language>.
107. See, e.g., E. GLYN LEWIS, MULTILINGUALISM IN THE SOvIET UNION 51 (1972).
108. See Kreindler, supra note 1.
109. See idatll1.
110. See Ralph S. Clem, The Ethnic Dimension of the Soviet Union, in CONTEMPORARY
SOVIET SOCIETY 11, 11-13 (Jerry G. Pankhurst & Michael Paul Sacks eds., 1980).
111. See generally LEWIS, supra note 107, at 24-25.
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of the largest groups had their own "areas.""' There were four main ad-
ministrative units. First, there were fifteen Union Republics which had the
largest representation. Second in status were the twenty autonomous re-
publics with powers outside the jurisdiction of the USSR Constitution and
the constitution of the republic in which they were located. Third in status
were the eight Autonomous Provinces, such as Birobidzhan and Nagomo-
Karabakh, which were under the jurisdiction of the USSR, and for whom
the Supreme Soviet adopted laws, after a recommendation from the re-
public in which they were located. Finally, the ten National Districts were
the smallest units with the least status. The Soviet government created
these areas for the symbolic representation of national groups. The Na-
tional Districts accepted the laws of the USSR Constitution. With fifty-
three administrative units representing national groups, a little over half of
the USSR's nationalities had some sort of national territory and regional
representation. Inadvertently, the Soviet system ensured the perpetuation
of linguistic communities for this fortunate half."'
In the Soviet Union multi-ethnicity overlapped with multi-lingualism
and the quality of ethnic relations was very closely linked to language
attitudes and the consequences of language policy." 4 Inter-ethnic conflict
between non-Russians was common in the republics, but the language
policies of the central government created the greatest examples of ethnic
competition within the republics. Moscow pursued a policy of
"Russification" to assimilate the other republics into a Russian cultural
identity by phasing out the use of other languages. In the republics, this
policy forced linguistic confrontations into an easy taxonomy of the Rus-
sian versus the native, non-Russian.
Under the Soviet system, political factors were mixed in support of
either minority languages or Russian. Generally, minority languages
benefitted from prerogatives such as cultural inertia, promotion of
"proletariat literacy," the alleged usefulness of these languages in helping
minority nationalities acquire Russian as a second language, and the pro-
motion of some of the minority languages in States that border the
USSR."5 However, federalist and ideological concerns favored the prom-
ulgation of Russian because of several factors.
112. See JERRY F. HOUGH & MERLE FAINSOD, How THE SOVIET UNION IS GOVERNED
480-85 (1979).
113. In fact, Lewis goes so far as to say that "[ilt is doubtful however, whether the non-
Russian national languages could have advanced as they have done, or have become so instru-
mental in promoting the cultural development of the nationalities" if it were not for the specific
administrative structure of the Soviet Union. See Lewis, supra note at 107, at 58.
114. See RASMA KARKLUNS, ETHNIC RELATIONS IN THE USSR: THE PERSPECTIVE FROM
BELOW 55-56 (1986).
115. Id. at 55-59.
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First, through a combination of cultural and political forces, Russian
became the linguafranca of the Soviet Union." 6 Its very important role in
Soviet society was unmatched by any other language."7 In all of the re-
publics, Russian was taught in the schools."' It was the main language of
administration and science and was the language used by the army." 9 In
general, Russian became so pervasive in the USSR that:
[n]o important career can be pursued, no technical breakthrough
recorded, no important decision implemented in [a language
other than Russian]. All other languages play only limited politi-
cal and social roles and approximate the importance of Russian
only in cultural and social fields, and this within the borders of
their respective Union republics, and never throughout the USSR
as a whole.'2
Second, Russian was the language of the Communist Party; it was the
language spoken in the meetings of the General Assembly, and on a more
ideological level, it was touted as the "language of the Great Lenin.'' In
an attempt to justify the necessity for learning Russian, one Soviet lin-
guist noted, "Every historical language carries in itself not only new
linguistic forms, but also a new socio-political content .... The Russian
language is the first world language of internationalism, hostile to people
being caught by cosmopolitanism."'
2
Finally, Russian was, and continues to be, one of the five most im-
portant world languages. As Professor Adler notes, if nothing else,
"Russian is, above all, the language of prestige."' 23 There is some dispute
as to whether this was because of independent factors or because it was so
widely promoted by Soviet language polices, particularly those of
Khrushchev. The fact that Russian grew despite Lenin's original belief
116. See, e.g., William W. Derbyshire, Russification versus De-Russification: Some Lin-
guistic Thoughts, in ETHNIC RUSSIA IN THE USSR: THE DILEMMA OF DOMINANCE 260, 260-
61 (Edward Allworth ed., 1980).
117. See Tomas Venclova, Two Russian Sub-Languages and Russian Ethnic Identity, in
ETHNIC RUSSIA IN THE USSR, supra note 116, at 249,249-50.
118. See Kriendler, supra note 1, at 7 (indicating that "Russian was made a compulsory
subject in all school of the Soviet Union" by a March 1938 decree of Stalin).
119. See Michael Rywkin, The Russia-Wide Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR):
Privileged or Underprivileged?, in ETHNIC RUSSIA IN THE USSR, supra note 116, at 179-87
passim.
120. Id. at 181-82.
121. Kriendler, supra note 1, at 22.
122. D. Zaslavskii, Velikii iazyk nashei epokhi [The Great Language of Our Era],
LITERATURNAIA GAZETA, Jan. 9, 1949, at 3, quoted and translated in MAX K. ADLER,
MARXIST LINGUISTIC THEORY AND COMMUNIST PRACTICE 110 (1980).
123. ADLER, supra note 122, at 205.
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that Russian should be on par with the other languages in the Soviet Un-
ion seems to indicate that Khrushchev's policies were instrumental.
B. Soviet Language Policy
In the USSR, linguistic origin was usually an important part of ethnic
identity.74 In the Baltic republics especially, language was always closely
linked to ethnicity.'" However, in the Central Asian republics, because of
their particular development, religion, and tradition played a larger role in
ethnic self-identification than language."6 Soviet linguists never recog-
nized this reality and insisted that even in these Central Asian republics
language was always a key factor in ethnic self-identification. In keeping
with Marxist theory, the leaders of the Soviet Union from Stalin to Gor-
bachev maintained, despite different policies, that changes in "linguistic
identity" pave the way for changes in "ethnic identity." As Kozlov notes,
"The importance of the community of language for general economic,
political and other spheres of human activity is very great. Groups of in-
dividuals who change languages usually, in the long-term, also change
their ethnic identity."'27
"'Language planning' refers to systematic policies designed to main-
tain or change existing language situations."" m Soviet language planning
may be defined as efforts by the government to change the structure or
use of the languages of the Soviet Union. Language policies existed in the
Soviet Union as goals that were set to affect the languages spoken by the
citizens.' Therefore, Soviet policy can be categorized as "language-status
planning" rather than "language-corpus planning."'3 That is, Soviet policy
centered on changing the sociological position of the language rather than
on changing the inner structure of the language.
These changes in sociological position were planned through various
facets of language repertoires, including education, alphabets, and litera-
ture. Particularly in the realm of education, Lenin and Stalin made much
progress in giving the non-Russian languages a firm basis. However,
124. See KARKLINS, supra note 114, at 24.
125. See generally KRISTIAN GERNER & STEFAN HEDLUND, THE BALTIC STATES AND
THE END OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE 68 (1993) (explaining that language is one of the
"fundamental differences between the three [Baltic states]").
126. See generally S. Enders Wimbush, The Soviet Muslim Borderlands, in THE LAST
EMPIRE: NATIONALITY AND THE SOVIET FUTURE 218, 219-220 (Robert Conquest ed., 1986).
127. VICTOR KOzLov, THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION 169 (Pauline M. Tiffen trans.,
Hutchinson Educ. & Ind. U. Press 1988).
128. Jonathan Pool, Soviet Language Planning: Goals, Results, Options, in SOVIET
NATIONALITY POLICIES AND PRACTICES 223,224 (Jeremy R. Azrael ed., 1978).
129. See Jonathan Pool, Whose Russian Language? Problems in the Definition of Linguis-
tic Identity, in ETHNIC RUSSIA IN THE USSR, supra note 116, at 237, 237.
130. See Kreindler, supra note 1, at 1.
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Khrushchev reversed this trend by reinstating the use of Russian in most
areas of life.
Not only did Soviet policy vary in the areas of social language use it
targeted but also, over time, in the different goals it pursued. 3' In fact,
Professor Pool has noted that the Soviet Union "has been extraordinarily
ambitious in its attempts to reshape an extremely complex linguistic
situation."'' 2 Khrushchev's policies were the most ambitious because his
language planning directly impacted Russification.'" Of course even
much of Khrushchev's policy was determined by the Soviet Union's
Tsarist history and the influence of Marxist-Leninist theories.
C. The Soviet Inheritance: The Tzarist Legacy
and Marxist Theory
Tsarist policies left the Bolshevik Russians in control of many non-
Russian territories with different histories, cultures, and languages. Rus-
sian was the official language," and "Russian chauvinism continually fed
the flame of nationalism among the oppressed peoples."'35 Tsarist at-
tempts at Russification had failed to various degrees, leaving the
Bolsheviks with a multinational and multilingual mosaic.36 Although the
Bolsheviks criticized the Tsarist regime for many injustices and mistakes,
neither the leaders nor, for that matter, Soviet scholars have criticized the
rulers of Russia for their policy of "territorial aggrandizement and con-
quests.""' They do criticize the Tsarist regime for the policy of "forced
Russification and assimilation" and claim that Soviet policy ended this
imperial goal. These claims were largely false. Though some early Bol-
shevik policies fostered national languages in those areas where
independence movements supporting those languages had not previously
been crushed, it is clear that Soviet language policy, and especially
131. Although the existence of a definite language policy in the Soviet Union will be an
assumption of this paper, Adler offers some evidence to support this assumption. See ADLER,
supra note 122, at 123-25.
132. See Pool, supra note 128, at 223.
133. For an example where this is discussed using language of instruction and non-
Russian publications as measures, see Brian D. Silver, Language Policy and the Linguistic Rus-
sification of Soviet Nationalities, in SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICIES AND PRACTICES, supra
note 128, at 250, 256-302.
134. It was the only language of the courts of justice, the government, schools and the ad-
ministration. See WILLIAM M. MANDEL, SOVIET BUT NOT RUSSIAN: THE 'OTHER' PEOPLE OF
THE SOVIET UNION 30-31 (1985).
135. HANS KOHN, NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION 41 (E.W. Dickes trans., George
Routledge & Sons 1933).
136. See ADLER, supra note 122, at 114-15.
137. KONSTANTIN SYMMONS-SYMONOLEWICz, THE NON-SLAVIC PEOPLES OF THE
SOVIET UNION vi (1972).
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Khrushchev's language policy, repeated that of pre-revolutionary Russia,
in many respects.
Marxist theory also influenced the Soviet leaders. Although there is
no coherent work by Marx or Engels on the subject of language, scholars
in different countries have been able to piece together a few facts. Ac-
cording to Marxist theory, language and society are mutually dependent:
language is a product of society, and society is a product of language.'38
More specifically, Marx and Engels felt that language was a product of
the prevailing relationships between classes, and that language changed
with the removal of one ruling class by another. Marx felt that changes in
the process of production can lead to the disappearance of languages.
These and other "orthodox" Marxist views were modified in many ways
by the Soviet leaders, starting with Lenin. As Adler notes:
We [can] see that [Marxist-Leninist and Marxist] theories have
been changing since the Russian Revolution of 1917 and that they
passed through a number of, often contradictory, stages .... It is
a complicated story. If Lenin had subscribed entirely to the ortho-
dox Marxist language theories perhaps history would have shown
how close he was to them. But he did not do so-and his succes-
sors made use of his theoretical works in order to support their
own, often distorted views. 39
Because theoretical justifications and explanations are necessary for
government policies, Soviet scholars formulated their ideas in accordance
with the theories that were popular at that time. Many Soviet linguists and
ethnographers, in keeping with the theory of ethnic transformation, ar-
gued that ethnic evolution is a natural process. Kozlov, for example, notes
that language shift is part of an evolutionary process, and describes it as
"a change in the basic vocabulary of the language, an expansion or con-
traction of its function ... , the spread among members of a given ethnic
group of another language (often the language of international communi-
cation), the appearance of bilingualism and total transition to a second
language, i.e. linguistic assimilation."'" Kozlov differentiates between
natural and enforced assimilation, and argues that in the USSR only natu-
ral assimilation has occurred.' 4' However, since his definition of enforced
138. See ADLER, supra note 122, at 2.
139. Id. at 24.
140. KOZLOV, supra note 127, at 152-53 (emphasis added). For further explanation of
this, see also Y.V. Bromley, The Term 'Ethos' and Its Definition, in RACES AND PEOPLES 17, 22
(I.R. Grigulevich and S.Y. Kozlov eds., 1974); YV. Bromley & V.I. Kozlov, National Processes
in the USSR, in RACES AND PEOPLES, supra, at 116, 124-25.
141. See KOZLOV, supra note 127, at 154. The differentiation comes from Lenin's writ-
ings in which he argues that enforced assimilation is connected with capitalism, while natural
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assimilation actually comes closer to describing Soviet language policy,
and especially language policy under Khrushchev, it deserves reprinting
in full:
Enforced assimilation has been characteristic of countries with
ethnic inequality (including Tsarist Russia) and employs a range
of measures-such as a government and regional policy of as-
similation in school education and other spheres of life-whereby
the eradication of the language, culture and identity of ethnic mi-
norities is attempted by force.1
Therefore, it is important to answer the question of how Khrushchev justi-
fied his policies to correspond with Marxist-Leninist theories of natural
assimilation, and, conversely, why such polices were necessary if the So-
viet Union was indeed moving toward greater ethnic assimilation.
D. Language Laws in Independent Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania: 1918-1940
Before continuing the history of Soviet language policy, it is neces-
sary to take a chronological detour and briefly discuss the short
independent period of the Baltic states. Prior to 1918, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania were part of the Russian empire.14' During that time, the right to
use one's native language was limited in all areas of public life. No lan-
guage other than Russian was permitted in the courts or governmental
agencies at various levels."
After the 1917 Russian Revolution, the Soviet government declared
"the equality and sovereignty of Russia's nationalities" and the right of
these nationalities "to free self-determination up to seceding and the
organisation of an independent state."' 45 From 1918-1940, all three states
enjoyed independence. 4 During this time, all three had minority
assimilation after the revolution will have progressive implications. See V.I. LENIN, 24 POLNOE
SOBRANIE SOCHINENI [COMPLErE COLLECTED WORKS] 124-125 (1961).
142. KOZLOV, supra note 127, at 154.
143. See Dietrich A. Loeber, Language Rights in Independent Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania 1918-1940, in ETHNIC GROUPS & LANGUAGE RIGHTS 221, 222 (S. Vilfan et al. eds.,
1993). Of the three states, Lithuania was the only one that had a previous history of independ-
ence between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries. Id. See also Himmer, supra note 17, at
256-61.
144. See Loeber, supra note 143, at 224 (citing Law on the Judiciary of 1864, amended
1889, art. 557 (Russ.) and Statute on City Administration of 1892, art. 74 (Russ.)).
145. UMOZURIKE OJI UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 15
(1972).
146. See Loeber, supra note 143, at 221.
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linguistic and ethnic groups living within their borders.147 The Baltic states
experienced two distinct periods during this time.'" First, they allowed
non-majority languages (primarily Russian and German) to flourish
during a liberal democratic period, a9 while promoting their own national
languages as well. ° In the second period, language laws were enacted
that restricted the rights of the non-dominant ethnic groups."' In 1940, the
three states became part of the Soviet Union under the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact.'
E. Lenin's Nationality and Language Policies
On November 15, 1917, soon after they had seized power, the Bol-
sheviks published their Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia.
This document abolished all national privileges and restrictions, and
promised equality, sovereignty, and the right to self-determination.
Lenin's policy, as reflected in this early document and in many of his
writings, was one of trying to attain political unity as an alternative to
separation."' He argued that self-determination consisted of the right of
secession, to be proclaimed by the "oppressor" nation, coupled with free
147. See id. The non-dominant ethnic groups were mostly Russians, Byelorussians, Jews,
Germans, Poles, and Swedes. See id.
148. The liberal democratic period, in which the Baltic states enjoyed parliamentary rule,
lasted from 1918 to 1926 in Lithuania and until 1934 in Estonia and Latvia. The second period
saw the rise of authoritarian rule. Id. at 221.
149. Id. at 224-25.
150. For example, the deputies to the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Parliaments were
allowed to use their native languages in Parliament. Id. at 225 (citing the Rules of the State
Assembly of Estonia of 1937 (Est.), the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure of 1929 (Lat.), and
the Rules of the Seimas (1924) (Lith.)). Note however that there were some distinctions in the
language policies of the three states. Id. at 236-38. For example, Estonia had the strongest pro-
tection of non-dominant languages as was seen in its creation of "cultural self-government" for
any ethnic group of more than three thousand persons. Id. at 237. Latvia on the other hand did
not set up a system of cultural autonomy, but did allow the minority ethnic groups the right to
self-administration of their schools. Id.
151. See id.
152. Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, Aug. 23, 1939, translated in DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1945,
ser. D, vol. 7, at 245 (U.S. Dept. of State 1956); Secret Additional Protocol, Aug. 23, 1939,
translated in DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1945, supra, at 246
[hereinafter Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact]. See also Asbjom Eide, Minority Situations: In Search of
Peaceful and Constructive Solutions, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1311, 1330 (1991). On the
status of the Baltic states under Soviet rule, see generally Igor Grazin, The International Recog-
nition of National Rights: The Baltic States'Case, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1385 (1991).
153. See Helene Carfare d'Encausse, Determinants and Parameters of Soviet National
Policy, in SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICIES AND PRACTICES, supra note 128, at 39,40.
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and voluntary union, proclaimed and acted upon by the "oppressed."'1
After the revolution, the idea of self-determination, the natural assimila-
tion process, and the granting of political equality would all act to remove
the basis for the bourgeois notion of nationalism. Nationalism, would then
whither away and be replaced by a country wide sentiment of proletarian
internationalism. 5
Lenin was idealistic as well as pragmatic; he believed in self-
determination, and also realized that it would be necessary to give the
republics the right to secede in order to have them join the Union. When
the USSR was created, the following nations were not included: Ukraine,
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Armenia, Poland, and Be-
larus. By the 1920s, the Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and Armenia had
joined.'56 Finland and Poland maintained their independence, and the
three Baltic states were forcibly incorporated by Stalin at the start of
World War ].157
It was Lenin's thesis that the people of Russia would learn Russian
voluntarily if it were not thrust upon them by force, because "the re-
quirements of economic exchange will always compel the nationalities
living in a single State (as long as they wish to live together) to study the
language of the majority."' 5 However, as the above quote indicates, this
argument assumes that the minorities did want to "live together" with the
Russians. In fact, many of them did not, even with the greater "freedoms"
promised to them by the Bolsheviks.'9 Even a Soviet ethnographer admits
that after 1917, in the formation of the republics, some towns became
centers of ethnic life and ethnic language revival.IW Kozlov notes, "From
the indigenous ethnic group cadres were formed for administrative, gov-
ernmental, cultural and educational establishments, in which knowledge of
154. See ALFRED D. Low, LENIN ON THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITY 43 (1958). See
also V.I. Lenin, A Letter to S.G. Shahumyan, in 19 COLLECTED WORKS 499, 501 (1963) which
provides the following (and in the present time, somewhat ironic) quote on secession:
We are in favour of autonomy for all parts; we are in favour of the right to secession
(and not in favour of everyone's seceding!) ... In general we are opposed to seces-
sion. But we stand for the right to secede owing to reactionary, Great-Russian
nationalism, which has so besmirched the idea of national coexistence that sometimes
closer ties will be established after free sucession!
155. See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, The Study of Ethnic Politics in the USSR, in
NATIONALISM IN THE USSR & EASTERN EUROPE IN THE ERA OF BREZHNEV & KOSYGIN 22
(George W. Simmonds ed., 1977).
156. See HOUGH & FAINSOD, supra note 112, at 85-86.
157. See Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, supra note 152; Eide, supra note 152, at 1330.
158. V.I. Lenin, Critical Remarks on the National Question, in 20 COLLECTED WORKS
18,20(1964).
159. See, e.g., Alexandre Bennigsen, Soviet Minority Nationalism in Historical Perspe-
citve, in THE LAST EMPIRE, supra note 126, at 131, 139-42.
160. See KOZLOV, supra note 127, at 178.
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the local language was needed. Language became the symbol of ethnic
identity, the buttress of social progress....""'
Lenin was aware of this situation, and felt that fostering the native
languages would be to the advantage of the newly formed Soviet govern-
ment. However, it is possible to interpret the language revivals, not as a
symbol of the success of the Bolsheviks in allowing for the promulgation
of native languages, but as a sign of rebellion against being forced to be-
come part of the Soviet Union. However, the non-Russian independence
movements were quickly crushed by the Bolsheviks, 162 and only then was
it possible to enforce the "liberal" language policies of Lenin.
Lenin recognized that the Russian language was important, but if it
were to become the official language of the Soviet Union or a compulsory
subject in non-Russian schools, it would drive people away.' His policy
stressed the absolute equality of all languages.'" Lenin's program won the
Bolsheviks the support of many nationalists who had originally opposed
them. In 1921, Lenin initiated work on alphabets for people with no
writing, which led to the creation of fifty-two new and sixteen reformed
alphabets.' 65 Lenin also changed written Russian by promoting the Latin
alphabet over the Russian alphabet because he considered the latter to be
"the alphabet of autocratic oppression, of missionary propaganda, of
Great Russian chauvinism."'" Although he was hampered by a lack of
language materials, Lenin encouraged a policy of language construction
to make the national languages more useful and complete.
While there is much debate about Lenin's pragmatism and idealism in
regard to nationalities, two things are clear. First, he believed that the so-
lution to the nationalities problem revolved around a retreat from Soviet
policies of centralization. As he noted in a letter in 1913: "The right to
self-determination is an exception from our general premise of centralisa-
tion. This exception is absolutely essential in view of the reactionary
Great-Russian nationalism .... ,"' Second, he realized toward the end of
his life, that "the idea of secession is just a futile piece of paper,"'6 " and
161. l (emphasis added).
162. See Hugh Seton-Watson, Russian Nationalism in Historical Perspective, in THE
LAST EMPIRE, supra note 126, at 14, 24.
163. See generally Kriendler, supra note 1, at 2-5.
164. See Bromley & Kozlov, supra note 140, at 131.
165. See Kreindler, supra note 1, at 3.
166. See id. This preference is especially ironic in light of the changes made after Khrush-
chev's reforms; for example, as discussed infra Part III, in Moldova, where the national
language of Moldovan uses the Latin alphabet, the people were required to use the Cyrillic
script instead.
167. Lenin, supra note 154, at 501.




began to understand that bureaucracy and basic conflict would destroy the
delicate peace initiated by the idea of self-determination. Stalin was
blamed in part for the latter, and when he came into power, he rejected
Lenin's warnings of the dangers of chauvinism, and enacted his own eth-
nic and language policies.
F. Stalin's Nationality and Language Policies
Joseph Stalin was originally chosen by Lenin to be in charge of the
nationality question. Since he was a Georgian, he was supposed to be a
more justifiable person for the job than a Russian. However, some feel
this idea may have actually backfired. Since Stalin was one of the minori-
ties, he felt no need to atone for past Russian wrongs inflicted on the
minorities.6 9
Some of Stalin's nationality and language policies (especially those
pre-1938) were rooted in Leninist theories.'70 Stalin coined the term
"national in form, socialist in content," and at first was also strongly op-
posed to any special privileges for the Russian language.17' Under Stalin,
language corpus planning extended to the greatest number of non-Russian
languages. By 1934, textbooks were being published in 104 different lan-
guages, as opposed to twenty-five languages only ten years earlier.
7
1
Additionally, there were great changes in language instruction, as Krein-
dler notes:
In the 1938-1939 school year more than 70 languages served as
the medium of instruction, and each individual republic attempted
to provide instruction in the mother tongue for each of its own
minorities. Thus, Uzbekistan, for example, offered instruction in
22 languages, the Ukraine in 17, while tiny Dagestan, with one of
the highest language densities per area, provided instruction in 20
languages. 17
Stalin's later policies (post-1938, and to some extent even the policies of
1930) were a step away from the earlier attempts at nativization. In 1930,
Stalin attacked Great Russian Chauvinism, but also "directed his most
blistering invective against 'deviation towards local nationalism, including
the exaggerated respect for national languages."" 74 The policy of
169. See, e.g., JOHN B. DUNLOP, THE FACES OF CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN NA-
TIONALISM 7 (1983).
170. See Kriendler, supra note 1, at 5-11.
171. See id at6.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. LEWIS, supra note 107, at 71 (quoting Stalin).
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"korenizatstiia" (nativization) was abandoned, and the trend away from
local languages thus began.
"As Stalin consolidated his personal dictatorship, he launched mas-
sive assaults on both nationalism and religion.'07 However, Stalin's "Cult
of Personality" actually encouraged a revival of patriotism and Russian
nationalism, as Stalin noted in his toast to the "Great Russian People.",
76
The important factors of his later nationality policy were his personality,
the specific conditions of his time, including World War II, and the con-
solidation of absolute power by the General Secretary that occurred under
his rule. Stalin engaged in a rather ruthless policy of Russification and
assimilation, instead of self-determination.' 77 Stalin required assimilation
because it was the best way to control the clash between nation-building
and multi-ethnicity.
178
Stalin argued that ethnic assimilation proceeds in the following man-
ner:
[flrom the establishment of a linguistic community and the de-
velopment of a consciousness of peoplehood (narodnost),
through the operation of the forces of capitalism leading to the
formation of a bourgeois nationality (natsional nost), to a true so-
cialist nationhood, free of all vestiges of class or property."
However, Stalin's language policy was a significant departure from
Marxist-Leninist theory. As Adler notes, Stalin "interfered in all aspects
of Soviet life," including linguistics.'O The departure from Marxist theory
is most apparent in Stalinist arguments that language cannot be consid-
ered to be equal with any other social phenomena.'' Marxist philosophy
had argued just the opposite to be the case.12 Additionally, in his policies
and his writing Stalin denied Marx's idea that language changes with the
removal of one ruling class by another. 3 Stalin argued that cultural
autonomy in the non-Russian republics and regions was usually conser-
vative in nature and thus inhibited economic and social development. His
175. Charles E. Ziegler, Nationalism, Religion and Equality Among Minorities: Some Ob-
servations on the Soviet Case, J. ETHNIC STUD., Summer 1985, at 19, 21.
176. This toast was in 1945, after the war was over. See Kriendler, supra note 1, at 8.
177. See E. L. Cerroni-Long, Ideology and Ethnicity: An American-Soviet Comparison, J.
ETHNIC STUD., Fall 1986, at 1, 15.
178. See generally id.
179. THE NON-SLAVIC PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION, supra note 137, at v.
180. ADLER, supra note 122, at 59. Adler goes on to criticize Stalin for his interference by
noting that, "Stalin knew nothing about this subject, except perhaps his personal experience, a
Georgian, member of a minority language, who was thrown into the great Russian nation and
who could never lose his foreign accent" Ia.
181. See generally id. at 59-76.
182. See generally id at 2-24.
183. See generally id at 59-76.
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solution was that backward nations needed to be drawn into "higher,"
more developed cultures. Language change would therefore not require
changes in the ruling class. Instead, "[m]odernization would promote as-
similation. ' "
Stalin also felt that the relations between nations were like the rela-
tions between classes, characterized by a constant struggle which must be
resolved by force. To this end, he liquidated national elites, exported large
numbers of Russians to the Baltics and other republics, and deported peo-
ple from the dominant ethnic groups of those republics. 5 Although in
theory he was only going against groups that were threatening his rule, it
may be argued that Stalin's strong hold on power eliminated any realistic
threat to his rule. The purges of the national elites dealt a striking blow to
the development of native languages. The elimination of the native intel-
ligentsia eliminated a group of people who ensured the cultural survival
of the native languages.
Russian was made a compulsory subject in all the schools of the So-
viet Union by Stalin's Decree of March 1938.116 Stalin justified this rather
striking departure from Leninist principles by stating that the position of
the Russian language had become extremely weakened. Russian was pro-
claimed a language of "high culture" and, more importantly, the
"language of socialism," and an influx of Russian words and terms began
to infect the non-Russian languages.' 7 However, this action was less criti-
cal to the promotion of Russian in the USSR than was Khrushchev's
educational reform that allowed parents to choose the language of educa-
tion for their children.'" Stalin's policy was more a symbolic display of
the greatness of the Russian language. Furthermore, it had lesser effect
since so many non-Russians were already learning Russian. Enforcement
of the decree was not as effective as it could have been, and in many cases
the Russian language instruction was weak. Finally, and most importantly,
the decree still ensured that the education itself would be in the native
language. Khrushchev's policies, however, reversed this trend completely,
and ironically did even more to promote the Russian language.
There are two ways to evaluate Stalin's overall language policies. On
one hand, Lenin realized that Stalin opposed his nationality policy and
fought to have him removed as party secretary. Stalin purged national
184. Ziegler, supra note 175, at 21.
185. See, e.g., Andrea J.Hanneman, Note, Independence and Group Rights in the Baltics,
35 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 493 (1995). According to some estimates, "[mI]ore than half a million
out of a total population of 6 million [in the Baltics] disappeared" through terror and deporta-
tion, reaching a climax in 1949. GERNER & HEDLUND, supra note 125, at 59.
186. See Kriendler, supra note 1, at 7.
187. See id at 8.
188. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
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elites and argued for the superiority of the Russian language and people.
On the other hand, national languages flourished under Stalin, and some
even stress that attempts to Russify the non-Russian languages simply
meant that these languages were still considered important." 9 In fact, in a
1925 speech, Stalin even stated his opposition to policies that were later
to be actually conducted by Khrushchev:
I have very little faith in this creation of a single universal lan-
guage and the dying away of all other tongues in the period of
socialism. I have very little faith in this theory of a single, all-
embracing language. Experience in every case speaks not for, but
against this theory."
Kreindler argues that there was never a real change in the status of
Russian under Stalin. She further argues that "no new justifying theory
[was put forth] to change the status of Russian among the non-Russian,
other than [Stalin's] personal glorification of the Russian people."'9'
However, this personal justification may have been all the theory that was
needed, since it is important to keep in mind that at the peak of his leader-
ship Stalin was powerful enough to act however he wanted, without
having to justify his actions and policies through theory. Finally, the evi-
dence of the language instruction and non-Russian language publishing
may simply serve as testimony to the success and continuance of Lenin's
policies, without being a reflection on Stalin.
Thus, it is probably best to view Stalin's language policies some-
where between these two extremes, but closer to the first. Stalin did
pursue a policy of Russification since he attempted to widen the scope
and influence of Russian language and culture; Stalin felt that the Russian
must act as a Big Brother toward the other national groups. The total
obliteration of minority languages was impossible during Stalin's tenure.
Therefore, Stalin can then be understood as an intermediary in language
policy between Lenin and Khrushchev-but one who certainly contrib-
uted to the development of Soviet language policy.'92 He was a strong
enough leader to allow some measures of linguistic development, but this
was coupled with a strong and definitely new push in favor of the Russian
189. See Kreindler, supra note 1, at 9-11. It is important to note that the distinction be-
tween the two is also the distinction between Stalin's later and earlier policies. This article
focuses more on Stalin's later policies since these had more impact, and on his departure from
Leninist principles of promoting the local languages.
190. Jacob Ornstein, Soviet Language Policy: Theory and Practice, SLAVIC AND E. EUR.
J., Spring 1959, at 1, 3 (footnote omitted) (quoting from Stalin's speech of May 18, 1925 before
the University of the Peoples of the East).
191. Kreindler, supra note 1, at 9 (emphasis added).
192. And of course affected the demography and ethnic distribution in the Baltic and other
republics and states through his policies of deportation.
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language. Without this push and without the elimination of the national
elites it would have been much harder for Khrushchev to pursue his lan-
guage policy. Additionally, it is important to note that the very theory to
justify the superiority and necessity of the Russian language that was
missing under Stalin, was supplied under the leadership of Khrushchev.
G. Khrushchev's Language Theory and Policies
1. Khrushchev's Goals as a State Leader
As soon as he gained power after Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev
realized that he would have to be a strong state leader. The problems fac-
ing him were a very powerful bureaucracy, industry that stressed quantity
over quality, technology that was lagging behind the West, failing agri-
culture, and an inefficient labor force. 93 One of Khrushchev's goals was
to open up the system to the people; he wanted to overhaul the archaic
bureaucracy to make the system more effective. There are many argu-
ments about whether Khrushchev was a pragmatist or an idealist.'9 In
fact, like many leaders, he was probably both: he was an idealist in terms
of his desire to change the country, but he was a pragmatist in terms of his
political dealings and what he would have to do to achieve power. His
language policy and his education policy exemplified this pragmatic side.
Khrushchev suffered from Stalin's legacy. This legacy of terror still
haunted the nation, and rehabilitation created a group of dissatisfied peo-
ple who wanted-and in fact demanded-greater reparation for the way
that they had suffered. Khrushchev's reforms came from generally good
intentions, but in many cases they came too quickly for the people.
Khrushchev faced challenges from the West, and dissatisfaction from his
populace.'" He realized that would have to find solutions for all of these
problems in order to be successful.
Despite early policies of reform, in many areas Khrushchev was
forced to slow down the process because it was not making the system
more effective, and was in fact stirring up dissatisfaction from all sides.
Around 1963, Khrushchev began to feel threatened by what he felt was an
upsurge in liberalism and he therefore increased restrictions on the intelli-
gentsia.'" This was quickly followed by increased harassment of the same
193. See Martin McCauley, Introduction to KHRUSHCHEV AND KHRUSHCHEVISM I
(Martin McCauley ed., Macmilliam Press 1987).
194. See, e.g., CARL A. LINDEN, KHRUSHCHEV AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP: 1957-
1964, at 25 (1966).
195. See McCauley, supra note 193, at 3.
196. See ROY A. MEDVEDEV, KHRUSHCHEV 219-20 (Brian Pearce trans., Basil Blackwell
1982).
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groups who had benefitted from his earlier policies. In the case of lan-
guage policy, Khrushchev was forced to take a strong stance almost
immediately, and in cases where there had been some national expression
or sentiment allowed in the early stages of his rule, by the last three years
of his leadership these changes were also reversed.
2. Nationality and Language, Theories, and Polices
From the beginning, Khrushchev argued that Leninist nationality
policy should be carried out. However, his other statements disagreed
with basic Leninist principles that an internationalist approach would be
necessary to preserve the Union. In some respects, Khrushchev gave Rus-
sians and non-Russians greater freedom in examining their histories.
Coupled with his denunciation of Stalin, this freedom may have provoked
an upsurge in nationalism, among Russians deserving a new guiding ide-
ology. 97 Non-Russians were also given a slightly more open forum for
expressing their views. However, in his later years, Khrushchev became
threatened by the non-Russians and took away some of these freedoms. 9
Khrushchev felt that the Soviet system had changed the social con-
sciousness of the national groups. They had moved from national
consciousness to socialist consciousness, and were moving toward com-
munist consciousness. Thus, national differences were merely survivals of
the past, and the nations of the USSR, having already drawn closer to one
another (sblizhenie), were advancing to a point where they would merge
into a single nation (sliianie).1" Thus, arguably, since the nationality
problem had already been solved, there was no need to promote non-
Russian languages; °° instead, Russian needed to be developed as the lan-
guage of communication.
For Khrushchev, although the USSR was a multi-ethnic State, social-
ist ideology made these ethnic issues secondary. For example, he noted
the following in a speech in 1957:
The Communist Party, guided by V.I. Lenin's precepts that
literature and art are an integral part of the nationwide struggle
for communism, has always attached and continues to attach
prime importance to the activities of writers, artists, sculptors,
197. See S. Enders Wimbush, The Great Russians and the Soviet State: The Dilemmas of
Ethnic Dominance, in SOvIET NATIONALITY POLICIES AND PRACTICES, supra note 128, at 349,
350. See also DUNLOP, supra note 169, at 30-32.
198. See generally ROY A. MEDVEDEV & ZHOREs A. MEDVEDEV, KHRUSHCHEV: THE
YEARS IN POWER 144-45 (Andrew R. Durkin trans., W.W. Norton 1978) (1975).
199. See d'Encausse, supra note 153, at 51-52.
200. See generally Kreindler, supra note 1, at 18.
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composers and all workers of Soviet culture, to the flourishing of
our multinational Soviet socialist culture."°
3. Khrushchev's Early Policies to Promote Russian
Another major point of emphasis for Khrushchev were the rights of
the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Although
these rights were not technically part of Khrushchev's "language policy,"
they did reflect Khrushchev's general policies toward nationalities and
indicated his intent to promote the Russian culture and language at the
cost of the minority languages of the Union. While Lenin felt that the
Russians should not impose their language and culture on the smaller
groups, Khrushchev stressed that the Russian people should be respected
and their achievements recognized with gratitude.m While he noted that
the non-Russian Republics flourished, he emphasized that they did so
under the umbrella of Soviet culture and with the assistance of the Rus-
sian people:
... the Russian people have done much, very much indeed, to
help the formerly oppressed peoples of the country to overcome
their age old economic and cultural backwardness and to raise
them to their own level. The great and lofty deeds of the Russian
people both in the years of peaceful construction and in the pe-
riod of the war trials earned them the warm gratitude and respect
of all the peoples of our country. °3
Interestingly, Khrushchev seems to have equated "non-Russian" with
"oppressed," leaving the Russian people in a special group. Although
"Russian" and "Soviet" refer to distinctly different concepts, Khrushchev
had apparently defined the Soviet Union as a Russian entity. One can
strongly infer that merging the nations into one Soviet nation would mean
Russification of the non-Russian.
Khrushchev focused the Communist Party on the RSFSR. After the
Twentieth Party Congress he established a special "Russian Republic Bu-
reau of the Central Committee," installed himself as Chairman of that
Bureau, and staffed it with his supporters.2°4 Moreover, the Russian Re-
public Council of Ministers was vested with the powers and rights
201. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Za tesnuia sviaz' literatury i iskusstua s zhizn'iu naroda [For
Close lie Between Literature and Art and the Life of the People], PRAVDA, Aug. 28, 1957, at 3,
translated in KHRUSHCHEV SPEAKS: SELECTED SPEECHES, ARTICLES AND PRESS CON-
FERENCES, 1949-1961, at 270 (Thomas P. Whitney ed., 1963) (emphasis added).
202. See McCauley, supra note 193, at 75-76.
203. Id at 277.
204. See HOUGH & FAINSOD, supra note 112, at 215.
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necessary to guide industry, agriculture, and cultural work. Thus, in
Krushchev's supposedly equal and non-national USSR, the RSFSR was
claimed to have finally won its "full rights relative to its importance and
place in the state."
4. The Twenty-Second Party Congress: Sliianie and
the Official Status of Russian
Khrushchev made a major change in the status of the Russian lan-
guage in the USSR. Under him Russian became not only more prevalent,
but actually began replacing some of the native languages, at least in offi-
cial or public realms. Reasons for his policies included the idea that
nationalism complicated central decisionmaking and hampered technical
and scientific progress. Many scientific journals were in minority lan-
guages which made it difficult to pool information over the whole
country.' * Thus, Khrushchev argued that Russian must be the language of
science and technology, and the necessary channel to becoming more ad-
vanced.
According to Khrushchev's theories, Russian was supposed to play an
important role in the merging of nations; it would not be a foreign lan-
guage, but a naturally formed second mother tongue. Under Khrushchev's
idea of "sliianie," one language (Russian) was envisaged as having all of
the advantages that other languages possess. °7 If the nations of the USSR
were indeed merging, then Russian would emerge as the single dominant
language of communication in this new community.28 In fact, Lewis notes
the following:
[Sliianie] encourages the substitution of one language for others,
the substituted language having increasingly overlapping roles
with all other languages, rather than being complementary to
them .... It is claimed, for instance, that voluntary exposure to
educational mass media.., is determined not according to mem-
bership of the national group, but according to more general,
impersonal, civic interest.m9
205. Khrushchev, supra note 201, at 277 (emphasis added).
206. The section on Khrushchev's reasons for implementing his language policy analyzes
some of these assumptions in greater detail. For now we shall use them as simply stated reasons
for why it was necessary to increase Union-wide knowledge of Russian.
207. See LEWIS, supra note 107, at 84.
208. See Yaroslav Bilinsky, The Soviet Education Laws of 1958-59 and Soviet Nationality
Policy, 14 SOvIET STUDIES 138, 148-50 (1962).
209. LEWIS, supra note 107, at 84 (citing E. Mansurov, Summary of paper given at the
Cannes Conference of Sociologists in 1969, in ASPECTS OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC LOYALTY
(H. Tajfel ed., 1969)).
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During the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961, Khrushchev ar-
gued that the nations of the USSR were merging into a new community.
In his report on the party programs Khrushchev claimed that "[e]very citi-
zen of the USSR enjoys and will continue to enjoy full freedom to choose
the language of instruction for his children. Nothing impedes the devel-
opment of national languages in our country. But their development must
tend not to reinforce barriers between peoples but to draw nations closer
together.'2 ° Of course, Khrushchev's statement is in a sense self-
defeating. The only way Khrushchev could bring nations together is
through a single language, Russian. Khrushchev's recognition of the need
for a prominent Russian language was evident from his discussion of
" sliianie:"
One cannot help noticing the growing eagerness of non-Russian
peoples to master the Russian language, which has become virtu-
ally a second native tongue for the peoples of the U.S.S.R., a
means of intercourse among them, a vehicle for bringing each
nation and nationality into contact with the cultural achievements
of all the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and with world culture ....
The nations are drawing closer together in our country and their
social homogeneity is growing. In the course of the full-scale
building of communism the nations will achieve complete
unity ....
With uncompromising Bolshevist implacability we must eradi-
cate even the slightest manifestation of nationalist survivals.
The friendship of the peoples of the USSR is one of our greatest
achievements. We must cherish it as the apple of our eye!
211
This emphasis on a unifying single language was furthered in the discus-
sion of the Khrushchev and the Gorkin Reports of the Twenty-Second
Party Congress. There Mukhtidinov, Secretary of the Party Central Com-
mittee, (himself an Uzbek), agreed with Khrushchev, noting that:
[t]he Russian language is of fundamental importance in the fur-
ther development of every socialist nation, the internationalist
210. 0 Programme Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza [On the Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union], PRAVDA, Oct. 19, 1961, at 7, translated in CURRENT
SOVIET POLICIES IV: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF THE 22' CONGRESS OF THE COM-
MUNIST PARTY OF THE SOvIET UNION 83, 104 (Charlotte Saikowski & Leo Gruliow eds., 1962)
[hereinafter CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES].
211. Id
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upbringing of the growing generation and completion of the cul-
tural revolution in our country.
2 12
This was more than an argument that the nations were starting to
grow closer. "Merging" in this case "betokened the ideological and cul-
tural unity of all Soviet peoples but also was intended to suggest a
biological homogenization of the national components of the USSR.""'
Although merging thus seems like a complete departure from his prede-
cessor's policies, it is actually better viewed as conglomeration. Lenin had
argued that with political equality and self-determination, the basis for
bourgeois nationalism would wither away to create an atmosphere of
proletarian internationalism. Stalin demanded a special status for the Rus-
sian people in the Union. Khrushchev was less vigorous than Stalin. He
too foresaw a special status for the Russian people but as a part of the
emerging conglomeration of the USSR's many nationalities. However, it
is important to note that "sliianie" was more than just a description of an
ethnic or ethno-linguistic phenomenon. Under Khrushchev, this idea be-
came a set of policies, guaranteed to ensure this "merging" with or
without the consent of the minorities.
As a means of granting this special status to the Russian people,
Khrushchev gave their language special status. At the Twenty-Second
Party Congress, the Russian language appeared as the "language of inter-
nationality communication and cooperation of all peoples of the
USSR. 214 Russian was clearly cast in the role of the primary language for
communication. The language of the educational reforms was substituted
for the earlier terminology about the right to education in one's native
language."' The "national in form, socialist in content" formulation still
appeared, but as a justification for the use of Russian as the "national
form" while implying that native languages were anti-socialist."6 Russian
promoters made pragmatic interpretive arguments to modify the slogan by
asserting that "forms change, advance and draw nearer together, shedding
all outdated traits that contradict the new conditions of life."" '2
212. Rech' tovarishcha NA. Mukhtidinova [Speech by Comrade N.A. Mukhtidinov],
IzvEsTnA, Oct. 26, 1961, at 3, translated in CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES, supra note 210, at
160, 163.
213. DUNLOP, supra note 169, at 136.






5. The Educational Reforms of 1958-1959
Khrushchev's educational reforms are among the most significant ex-
amples of his policy of Russification. As early as 1956, the RSFSR
Ministry of Education sponsored an Inter-Republic Conference on the
Improvement of the Teaching of Russian in Non-Russian Areas.2 ' In
opening the conference, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Uzbek Communist Party noted his distress at the fact that "students in
many... non-Russian general schools do not have a sufficient command
of the spoken [Russian] language, cannot easily make use of literature in
the Russian language, are not able to express their thoughts in a correct
Russian sentence." '219 As a result of this conference and of a mounting
volume of complaints in journals such as Russkii iazyk v shkole"° and
Inostrannyi iazyk v shkole,"2 ' educational organs began to call for the im-
provement of standards in the non-Russian schools and an intensification
of the Russian teaching program.222 This was the first step in a series of
educational reforms geared toward Russification.
The second, and probably the most important aspect of Khrushchev's
language policy was his educational reform law, passed by the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR on December 24, 1958. The most widely discussed,
and probably most significant aspect of the law is what is known as The-
sis 19, which allowed parents to choose the language of education for
their children. 23 Because it was the most important part of Khrushchev's
language policy, Thesis 19 is worth reprinting in full:
Instruction in the Soviet school is conducted in the native tongue.
This is one of the important achievements of the Leninist nation-
ality policy. At the same time, in schools of the Union and
autonomous republics, the Russian language is studied seriously.
This language is a powerful means of international communica-
tion, of strengthening friendship among the peoples of the USSR,
and of bringing them into contact with the wealth of Russian and
world culture.
Nevertheless, we must note that in the area of language study in
the schools of the Union and autonomous republics children are
considerably overloaded. It is a fact that in the nationality schools
218. See Ornstein, supra note 190, at 11.
219. Id at 11 (quoting N.A. Mukhtidinov).
220. Translated as "The Russian language in school."
221. Translated as "Foreign language in school."
222 See Ornstein, supra note 190, at 11. See generally Lewis, supra note 107, at 157-161
(discussing the expansion of the educational provisions).
223. See Bilinsky, supra note 208, at 138.
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children study three languages-their native tongue, Russian and
one of the foreign languages.
The question ought to be considered of giving parents the right to
send their children to a school where the language of their choice
is used, If a child attends a school where instruction is conducted
in the language of one of the Union or autonomous republics, he
may, if he wishes, take up the Russian language. And vice versa,
if a child attends a Russian school, he may, if he so desires, study
the language of one of the Union or autonomous republics. To be
sure, this step could only be taken if there is a sufficient number
of children to form classes for instruction in a given language.
To grant parents the right to decide what language a child should
study as a compulsory subject would be a most democratic pro-
cedure. It would eliminate arbitrary decisions in this important
matter and would make possible the termination of the practice of
overloading children with language study. Permission should be
granted not to include a foreign language among the required
subjects in schools where appropriate conditions do not exist. 24
Before this law was passed, instruction in the non-Russian republics was
usually conducted in the native language.2" The law set aside Stalin's de-
cree of the compulsory study of the Russian language and enabled parents
to choose the language of instruction for their children. Although the law
restored the "juridical equality of languages, it swept aside a firm shib-
boleth of Russian progressive thought which held that a child must be
taught in his mother tongue."2 6 By eliminating this pedagogic school of
thought the law struck a major blow against the minority languages in the
USSR.
Although the incorporation of a choice of instruction would seem to
give the native languages an equal footing, in actuality the Supreme So-
viet designed the law to pressure parents to choose Russian instruction.
The law increased the status of Russian in two ways. First, the section of
the law that states, "Instruction in the Soviet school is conducted in the
native tongue. This is one of the important achievements of the Leninist
224. Zakon ob ukreplenii svyazi shkoly s zhizn'iu i o dal'neishem razvitii sistemy narod-
nogo obrazovaniia v SSSR [The law on strengthening the connection between school and life
and on the continued development of a national educational system in the USSR], PRAVDA,
Dec. 25, 1958, at 1 [hereinafter Law on National Educational System], translated in Bilinsky,
supra note 208, at 139.
225. However, there is some evidence that the required study of the Republic language
was not always taken seriously. See Bilinsky, supra note 208, at 139.
226. Kreindler, supra note 1, at 12.
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nationality policy" was replaced in the operative section of the law with
the phrase "Instruction in the Soviet school is conducted in any language
of free choice."2 The amendment deprived the native languages of past
legislative protection. Moreover, as Bilinsky points out, "voluntary" in the
USSR allowed people "to 'choose' only what is 'good for them"' as de-
termined, of course, by the authorities. B While outer-Republic
inhabitants may have had the right to choose, Russian had become so ex-
tensively used that constructively there was no choice if parents wanted
their children to be successful.
229
Second, although the evidence is not completely clear on this point,
the authorities appear to have used force to ensure Russian language edu-
cation.' Of course, the use of force would negate any remnants of
volition that remained in the system and would eliminate the best justifi-
cation for this policy. The instances of force were debated in the minority
communities and occasionally protested publicly.
6. Khrushchev's Language Rationalization Strategies
Although Khrushchev offered some justifications for his language
policy, they provide insufficient explanation for why he felt the need to
push for increased usage of Russian.231 Khrushchev argued that science
and technology would proceed much more slowly if they did not have a
lingua franca to facilitate discussion. However, minority language speak-
ers in scientific and technological fields quickly incorporated Russian
words as cognates within scientific communications. Non-Russians were
encouraged to borrow Russian "scientific, technical, literary, and artistic
terms."232 Moreover, Russian had quickly become prevalent in non-
scientific minority language repertoires after Stalin's 1938 decree "On the
compulsory teaching of Russian in Republic and Region schools."' 233 Ko-
227. Id. (quoting Law on National Educational System, supra note 224).
228. YAROSLAV BILINSKY, SECOND SOvIET REPUBLIC: THE UKRAINE AFTER WORLD
WAR H 172 (1964) (footnote omitted).
229. Scholars have noted that "acquisition of Russian as a second language [was] essen-
tially a pragmatic adjustment to incentives and opportunities to learn Russian." Silver, supra
note 133, at 300.
230. For example, one Soviet linguist, K. Khanazarov, admits that in some schools "force"
was used in transferring to Russian as the language of instruction. K. KH. KHANAZAROV,
SBLIZHENIE NATSII I NATSIONAL'NYE IAZYKI V SSSR [DRAWING CLOSER OF NATIONS AND
NATIONAL LANGUAGES IN THE USSR] 202 (1963).
231. For a discussion of why some considered a change in policy necessary, see LEWIS,
supra note 107, at 77.
232. See LEWIS, supra note 107, at 64 (describing the process of "linguistic engineering"
through the mass media).
233. See KozLov, supra note 127, at 167.
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zlov claims that this infestation of Russian terms into the minority lan-
guages may have begun as early as the Revolution:
A characteristic trait of the post-1917 period was the rapid spread
of terminology with an all-Union and essentially international
meaning such as kolkhoznik (collective farm worker) and udarnik
(shock-worker), etc. Such general Soviet words and also the in-
ternational scientific terms usually permeated the native
languages via Russian. The process of borrowing words form
Russian continues. Russian personal names and international
names have become widely used among many peoples of the
USSR.
As noted earlier, Khrushchev, as every other political leader, was also
concerned about consolidating and maintaining power."' But, as a
"liberating" influence in Soviet history, he did not have as strong a hold
on the government as had Lenin or Stalin. To keep the "Soviet Empire"
together, he had to adopt more restrictive language policies than those of
the other two leaders. The fact that Khrushchev concentrated on language
policies, and not necessarily "nationality" policies was not accidental. It is
difficult to change someone's ethnic identity, particularly when the best
available means of change is rhetoric about the brotherhood of Soviet
peoples. But since Soviet linguists and ethnographers insisted that
changing a person's language was a requirement for any change in ethnic
identity, Khrushchev targeted language policy as the best hope of coun-
tering rising nationalism and ethnic uprisings which threatened the
economic unity of the USSR.236
Thus, three main reasons emerge for Khrushchev's language policies:
to promote Russian in order to make the society more efficient, to protect
his hold on the government, and to suppress ethnic tensions. Interestingly
enough, even Western scholars were beguiled by Khrushchev's token
benefits for minority nationalities. As the following quote from Kohn in-
dicates, the strategy of enacting legislation that appeared to be giving the
234. d. It is interesting that Kozlov calls them "Soviet" words when they both have
clearly Russian roots.
235. See MEDVEDEV & MEDVEDEV, supra note 198, at 45.
236. Even American scholars note the important relationship between language and eth-
nicity. As Richard Pipes has noted:
Language, of course, is only one of several criteria of national viability, and it would
not be sound to base one's whole evaluation on the pattern of linguistic development.
But it is a most important criterion. The transition form one language to another is,
perhaps, the single most dramatic manifestation of a shift in national allegiance.
Richard Pipes, The Forces of Nationalism, 13 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 1, 6 (1964).
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minorities some freedom hid Khrushchev's true intent and painted an im-
age of the Soviet Union as a fair and truly multinational State:
The Soviet Union has enacted very elaborate minority legislation,
assuring to the minorities their schools and the official employ-
ment of their mother tongue; wherever minorities live together in
villages or districts, they have been brought together in adminis-
trative units in which their language and their national
characteristics have full play.... Hence the Soviet Union is free
from every attempt at cultural or lingual oppression or subordi-
nation of the smaller peoples or minorities in its territory ...
[T]he culture is not a national, a Russian culture but a supra-
national, proletarian, Communist one.2"
Khrushchev's language policies can be said to have fulfilled his goal
of promoting the Russian language. Of course, he met with resistance, but
he was able to overcome much of the protests to his policies, and impose
them in all of the republics. Finally, since he was the first leader to break
away from the "national in form, socialist in content" formula, and since
Brezhnev and other leaders (at least until Gorbachev, and perhaps even
him to some extent) continued Khrushchev's ideas, it is possible to say
that not only were his policies successful, but his theories had taken hold
intellectually.23
7. Responses to Khrushchev's Policies
a. Russian Nationalism
Khrushchev's policy of "merging," and his educational and adminis-
trative reforms worried both minority groups and Russian nationalists.
Dunlop notes that "[Khrushchev's] concept of sliianie gave rise to appre-
hension both in the ranks of minority nationalists-who feared that it
would result in Russification and assimilation-and in those of Russian
nationalists-who foresaw a loss of their cultural and biological iden-
tity."9
Khrushchev's language policies had several implications for the so-
cial sciences, and spawned a series of discussions about the role of
Russian and non-Russian languages. Some social scientists developed
new interpretations of Soviet nationality theory, such as Rogachev and
Sverdlin's idea of the Soviet people as a "New Historical Community of
237. KOHN, supra note 135, at 69, 87 (emphasis added).
238. This is an important point since Khrushchev was later criticized for his various other
policies.
239. DUNLOP, supra note 169, at 136.
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Peoples" where Russian played a crucial role. 2 Khanazarov argued that
Russian could become a new mother tongue for the non-Russian, and Zak
and Isaev stated that Russian would play a crucial and unique role in con-
solidating the new community of people.2 '" These theories not only were
part of the justification for Khrushchev's language policies, but also had
an impact on the non-Russians and Russians in the USSR. They worried
the non-Russians because they seemed to indicate that the minority cul-
tures would soon fade away. But, they also worried the Russians because
they felt the fading of minority cultures would strip the Russians of their
unique national identity.
A second type of discussion focused on the purity of the Russian lan-
guage and what effect the "official status" of the language would have on
its content. There was some vagueness about how the Russian language
would be used, and social scientists questioned whether it would maintain
its original linguistic structure or whether elements from other languages
would be incorporated into Russian. 22 Russians, concerned with the pu-
rity of their language, argued that the real danger facing the Russian
language was the effect of ideologues co-opting it as the language of gov-
ernmental activities. As Ozerov astutely and somewhat humorously
observed, a unique situation occurred in the Soviet Union which had
negative implications for the Russian language:
When a speaker addresses an audience, it very often happens that
he knows he is lying, that his audience knows that he is lying, and
that he knows his audience knows that he is lying, and everybody
has a deep sense of satisfaction of fulfilling his highest civic duty.
Under such conditions, language often ceases to be a means of
communication and acquires an entirely new function-that of
approved behavior. In the process of "ideologization" of lan-
guage, Russian, being the central government language of the
Soviet Union, has suffered more than the other languages. 3
Because of the constant use of Russian as the sole means of communica-
tion, any attempt at purification of Russian conflicted with Soviet
government designs to broaden Russian and to make it a general language
for a single Soviet people.2 Promulgating Russian, though superficially a
seeming benefit to the Russian people, was driven entirely by politics.
240. See Kreindler, supra note 1, at 15.
241. See id.
242. See generally Kenneth E. Nyirady, Language Purity and Russian Ethnic Identity, in
ETHNIC RussiA IN THE USSR, supra note 116, at 267, 267-75.
243. Nicholas Ozerov, Russian Language and Ethnocentrism in the Soviet Union, in
ETHNIC RussIA IN THE USSR, supra note 116, at 278, 280.
244. See Nyirady, supra note 242, at 275.
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There were many arguments that giving Russian this official status
would decrease the significance of the language as a unifying ethnic fac-
tor for the Russians. If non-Russians learned the language they would
"worsen" it by adding their own terms, and, if spoken throughout the
USSR as a second language, it would no longer be a unique language for
the Russians. 2'5 Some of the problems that the language faced were dia-
lectization, alterations, and pidginization.m Some Russian authors
protested about the loss of language purity, but these, arguments were
quickly hushed, since they conflicted with the government policy.2'7
Khrushchev's antipathy to Russian nationalism, and to all forms of
nationalism, appears quite strongly in his memoirs. For example, Khrush-
chev described his dislike of Solzhenitsyn's 1963 story, Matryona's
Home,2" in the following manner: ".. . I didn't particularly care for Solz-
henitsyn's second book, Matryona's Home. You can say it's a matter of
taste, but I'd say it's more a matter of mood." 9 This also indicates that his
policies which were meant to encourage the spread of Russian were not
geared toward increasing Russian nationalism. Just as the Russian nation-
alists feared, Khrushchev's nationality and language policies were aimed
at promoting a Soviet people; a "new historical community" in which all
semblance of national culture, Russian or non-Russian, would necessarily
be lost.
However, Russian nationalism actually rose as a result of Khrush-
chev's policies, both directly, as a response to the "de-purification" of the
Russian language, and indirectly, as a result of de-Stalinization, and the,
debunking of the ideological myth. As Dunlop notes, Khrushchev's
"Secret Speech" at the Twentieth Party Congress had several effects.
First, contrary to Khrushchev's wishes, it dealt a blow to Marxism-
Leninism, since people lost some confidence in the ideology that had
caused the horrors under Stalin's leadership. °'0 Second, it led to the gen-
eral loosening on at least some forms of artistic expression, thereby
giving a forum for writers such as Soloukhin and Solzhenitsyn. ' Third,
with Stalin's death, nationalist sympathizers in other cultural spheres also
began to feel less constrained . 2 All of this, coupled with the previously
245. For a more complete discussion of these arguments and some interesting current re-
sponses to them, see William W. Derbyshire, supra note 116, at 260-66.
246. See Nyirady, supra note 242, at 268-69.
247. See id. at 271-75.
248. A work with strong neo-Slavophile tones.
249. NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV, KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS: THE LAST TESTAMENT 73
(Strobe Talbott trans., 1974).
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described administrative reforms to give the RSFSR equal footing with
the other republics, led to an upsurge in Russian nationalism, which was
stronger than any previous such sentiment under Soviet rule."3
b. The Non-Russians
For the non-Russian republics, one major point of contention was the
educational reforms of 1958. The confrontation developed because, "in
the Soviet Union the provision of native-language schools [was] closely
linked with the status of a group as a compactly settled indigenous na-
tionality inhabiting its official republic or province."2  Khrushchev
challenged both the power and the indigenous languages of the republics.
His policies also attempted to Russify the non-republic minorities, but
little data on the effects of his policies on non-republic nationalities still
exists. Regardless, the responses of the republic leaders indicate that they
felt that Khrushchev's policies put their languages at risk.2"
The five Central Asian republics argued for the retention of the
obligatory study of Russian, but did not oppose Thesis 19 and choice of
language instruction very strongly.2" The opposition to the Thesis came
mostly from the Transcaucasian republics and from the Baltic states.z1
The republic leaders recognized that this policy would only strengthen the
position of the Russian language vis-A-vis each republic language and
would put the study of non-Russian languages in jeopardy by emphasiz-
ing the importance of Russian language schools.25' Professor Bilinsky
describes the opposition with the following example:
The Georgian deputy Abashidze emphasized that Georgian was
the "state language of the Republic" and asked, somewhat fool-
hardily perhaps, whether the existence of Russian-language
schools in non-Russian Republics was at all justified. He then
made the following appeal:
"Comrades deputies! We must not set up the Russian and the lo-
cal indigenous language one against another by allowing people
to choose between them. For us both languages are native lan-
253. Id. at 34.
254. Brian D. Silver, The Status of National Minority Languages in Soviet Education: An
Assessment of Recent Changes, 26 SOVIEr STUDIES 28, 39 (1974).
255. To simplify the analysis, the responses of the "republics" will be understood as the
responses of the leading national (titular) elites.
256. See Bilinsky, supra note 208, at 140.
257. Ud. at 140-153.
258. See KARKLINS, supra note 114, at 62-72.
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guages, both of them are indispensable, and both are obliga-
tory."z 9
Interestingly, after the discussion of Thesis 19 and the significant opposi-
tion by the republics, the leaders left it up to the republics to incorporate it
into law as each wished. In the end, Thesis 19 was incorporated into re-
public-level legislation everywhere except for Latvia and Azerbaijan.
After a slight push from Moscow in the form of far-reaching changes in
the leadership of these two republics, each incorporated Thesis 19 into its
laws.
In Latvia, in fact, Thesis 19 was very controversial and strongly con-
tested.210 In response to Thesis 19, the Latvian Supreme Soviet increased
the number of hours for the compulsory study of Latvian.26' However,
after Khrushchev's purge of the Latvian "national communists," Latvia
was forced to adopt Thesis 19.262
These and other instances indicate the responses of the national gov-
ernment to republic-level protests. In general, Khrushchev attempted to
infuse the native languages with Russian words, and through the Educa-
tion Reforms, attempted to make the study of Russian much more
prevalent. These policies were couched in theory, and the responses to
republic-level resistance were also justified through ideological or theo-
retical considerations. The effect was the disregarding of the wishes of the
republics and the growth in status of Russian.
H. Language Policy in Post-Khrushchev USSR
Leaders after Khrushchev were faced with essentially four options in
terms of language policy.263 The first was an attempt at complete Russifi-
cation of the non-Russians. The second was to encourage either
bilingualism for all except RSFSR Russians, or to encourage universal
bilingualism, with RSFSR Russians learning another Soviet language of
their choice. However, no language in the USSR had the status of Rus-
sian, and it would have been difficult to turn asymmetrical bilingualism in
the USSR into reciprocal bilingualism. The final option was to abandon
previous policy and allow the non-Russian languages to develop and
259. Bilinsky, supra note 208, at 144.
260. See John B. Dunlop, Language, Culture, Religion, and National Awareness, in THE
LAsT EMPIRE, supra note 126, at 263, 268.
261. See id See also Juris Dreifelds, Latvian National Demands and Group Conscious-
ness Since 1959, in NATIONALISM IN THE USSR & EASTERN EUROPE IN THE ERA OF
BREZHNEV & KOSYGIN, supra note 155, at 136, 138.
262. See Dunlop, supra note 260, at 268; Dreifelds, supra note 261, at 138.
263. See generally Pool, supra note 128, at 240-44.
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flourish. This was not a viable policy for Soviet leaders. The most ideal-
istic policy for the post-Khruschev leaders was arguably:
[allowing] slow progress toward stable, asymmetric bilingualism,
with non-Russian increasingly learning Russian but not aban-
doning their original languages.... [Therefore] if the Soviet
Union, by making good on its claim that Russian and the other
republic languages are symbiotic rather than antithetical, can
show that neither fear is warranted, it may provide a unique
model for reconciling complete linguistic unity with a high de-
gree of linguistic diversity!2"
Despite the options, the post-Khrushchev leaders tended toward the first
approach. Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chemenko continued most of
Khrushchev's language policies.
Gorbachev was also faced with a multitude of nationality problems.
Although he did not succumb to assimilationist policies, it was unclear
just how long he would have been able to control the State unless he be-
came more active in suppressing both non-Russian and Russian
nationalism. Gorbachev's position was that the nationality question had
been solved "in principle," and that the Soviet republics had "formed a
community based on brotherhood and cooperation, respect and mutual
assistance."26'5 In January, 1989, Gorbachev renounced the idea of
"sliianie" and started along the path of allowing more ethno-cultural and
linguistic freedoms. 26 However, by that time Russian had already
achieved its dominant position in the Soviet Union and the break-up of
the State and the policies of de-Russification were about to begin.
III. LANGUAGES LAWS IN THE BALTIc STATES-
RECLAIMING THE NATIONAL LANGUAGES
A. A Necessary Response to Russification: The Results of Soviet
Language Policy and the Loss of National Languages
Khrushchev's language laws quickly achieved the goal of Russifica-
tion in the Baltics as much as any other republic. Careful examination of
Soviet data on languages illustrate three ways in which Khrushchev's
policies succeeded. First, Khrushchev started a new perception of the
264. d at 244.
265. Thomas J. Samuelian, Cultural Ecology and Gorbachev's Restructured Union, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 159, 177 (1991) (citing Mikhail Gorbachev, Report on Nationality Policy to
the CPSU Central Committee, Sept. 19, 1989, REPRINTS FROM THE SOVIET PRESS, Nov. 30,
1989).
266. See generally Samuelian, supra note 265, at 178-80.
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Russian language as the most important language that was to be contin-
ued by the leaders that followed him. As Kreindler notes, this
combination "produced a new and much more solid theoretical scaffold-
ing in support of the superior position of Russian." '67 However, without
Khrushchev's abandonment of the "national in form, socialist in content"
doctrine, and without his notion that Russian had to be the common lan-
guage of the people, these new theories would not have emerged.
Second, in terms of actual changes, it is possible to examine the data
for how much the Russian language was spread over the Soviet Union.
Although it is difficult to measure the language instruction in the non-
Russian republic schools, it is possible to see that at least in some of the
republics (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) the trend turned toward increased
Russification of the schools. 6 Also, it is possible to see that after 1958
the national language schooling in the autonomous regions of the USSR
had been decreased in favor of Russian language schooling.269 Addition-
ally, although the process of complete adoption of Russian by a minority
ethnicity was lengthy, "the acquisition of Russian-language facility [did]
probably constitute a necessary step in such a transfer, since the typical
process of native language switching takes two or more generations and
requires an intermediate stage of bilingualism."270 Even though Khrush-
chev's policies might not have led to complete adoption, he did start the
process.
There are several important considerations in examining Soviet data.
First, the data on languages differentiates between where Russian is a na-
tive language and where a non-Russian language speaker is proficient in
Russian as a second or third language. Second, as many have noted, there
are some problems in reporting Soviet data.27' Third, at least in regard to
the census data, it is necessary to note that the question of native lan-
guages was framed identically in the Soviet population censuses of 1939,
1959, 1970, and 1979. The term "native language," in ethnic statistics, is
usually understood to mean the first language mastered. 1 2
Finally, data on Soviet language policy often reflects an increase in
the spreading of Russian throughout the country, but does not indicate
"language replacement" in all areas. Rather, as Fishman notes, language
shifts in the USSR are primarily "language displacements": "The Soviet
Union has attained universal Russification within sixty years....
267. Kreindler, supra note 1, at 18.
268. See Silver, supra note 254, at 38.
269. See id at 33-34.
270. Id at 35.
271. For instance, the data can be inaccurate either due to faulty census taking or biased
reporting. See Kreindler, supra note 1, at 29.
272. See KOZLOV, supra note 127, at 171.
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However, the Soviet Union ... has at least, thus far, only attained
universal familiarity with Russian as a second language. Only a very
minor proportion of the total ethnically non-Russian population has given
up its own mother tongue for Russian."27'3 Nonetheless, it is still possible
to measure changes in the spread of Russian in the population.
Furthermore, the rate of the spread of Russian, even if only as a second
language, was still quite significant compared to the rates of growth of
other languages in the world.
Most of the data on language policy results reveals that Russian lan-
guage instruction and Russian language use became more prevalent as a
result of Khrushchev's policies."4 In fact, the higher birthrates of the non-
Russian and the increases in the matriculation rates of non-Russians, tend
to hide the fact that, in relative terms, there probably was a decline in the
proportions of non-Russian studying in their native languages. 75
The programs were even more significant for those who did not have
autonomous republics. These people were even more strongly affected by
the increased emphasis on Russian, since there was not the linguistic
community that existed in the non-RSFSR republics. As the data indi-
cates, for eight of the minority groups with their own republics, the
proportion of people naming the language of their nationality as their na-
tive language dropped from 1959 to 1970.276 However, this drop can be
seen in most of the groups without republics.
Statistics on education are best examined at the republic level, since
not all republics kept equally careful records of language of instruction.
Azerbaijan, a republic which published comprehensive statistics of lan-
guage education offers some evidence to the success of Khrushchev's
language policies. In 1938-1939, there were 173 Russian language
schools in Azerbaijan.2 7 By 1940-1941, they had increased to 178, but
273. JOSHUA A. FISHMAN, LANGUAGE AND ETHNICITY IN MINORITY SOCIOLINGUISTIC
PERSPECTIVE 404-05 (1989) (citation omitted).
274. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 107, at 132-34. One argument to the contrary is Lipset's
examination of the languages of textbook publication, in which he concludes that the non-
Russian languages have not significantly declined. Harry Lipset, The Status of National Minor-
ity Languages in Soviet Education, 19 SOVIET STUDIES 181, 181-89 (1967). However, Lipset's
argument suffers from some methodological problems, most importantly his implicit acceptance
of the assumptions that the age structures of each nationality in a republic are similar, and that
children in all ethnic groups have identical matriculation rates. Therefore, his conclusions are
interesting, but fail to prove that the non-Russian languages became more prevalent or even
maintained their status, during Khrushchev's period. For a more detailed critique of Lipset, see
Silver, supra note 254, at 36-37.
275. See Silver, supra note 254, at 37.
276. See LEWIS, supra note 107, at 132-34.
277. See Yaroslav Bilinsky, Education of the Non-Russian Peoples in the USSR, 1917-




then decreased to 174 in 1953-1954 and 152 in 1958-1959.27' However,
under Khrushchev's Russification drive, the number rose to 166 in 1963-
1964." 9 Additionally, the number of Azerbaijani-Russian schools almost
doubled from 158 from 1940-1941 to 295 in 1963-1964.m Their rate of
increase was also accelerated under Khrushchev. In 1953-1954, there
were 183 such schools, in 1958-1959 there were 231, and in 1963-1964
there were 295."' As Bilinsky notes, the increase in Azerbaijani-Russian
schools is an important part of Russification. "Explicitly [this policy] is
designed to strengthen the friendship of peoples, but it can also be used as
an intermediary stage in the transformation of the entire school to an all-
Russian one."22
Finally, aside from increasing the actual number of schools or actual
number of students learning Russian, Khrushchev's reforms played a
significant role in changing the need of the non-Russian population to
learn the Russian language. Language policy usually promotes one
language over another and therefore obviously helps the native speakers
of that language. In the case of the USSR, language facility was very
closely linked to social mobility! 3 Khrushchev's reforms changed the
system enough so that all of those who wanted their children to advance
made sure that the children learned Russian. Thus, the need to make sure
that their children could succeed often outweighed the more ideological
considerations of having to learn another language. In many cases, the
results reflected a "tipping game" that sometimes occurs as a result of
language policy. Although there was some discussion about the necessity
of Russian language education, since Russian was such an important
language, many people opted for Russian language instruction.2 As






283. Some argue that "ethnicity" itself plays a role in social mobility, or that there is dis-
crimination against some national groups regardless of language. See KARKLINS, supra note
114, at 62-72. However, proficiency in Russian may help some nationalities overcome that
problem. This is especially true of non-native Russian speakers, such as the Central Asian na-
tionals who are given spaces in Russian universities, but must pay the entry cost of learning
Russian. Knowledge of Russian plays much less of a role for Soviet Jews because most of the
members of this group already speak Russian and are discriminated against simply on the basis
of their ethnicity.
284. It is important to note that this affected both the titular republic nationals and the
"minority" ethnic groups in the republics. Although, in some cases, this caused the titular na-
tionals to attempt to assimilate the minority nationals, in generally resulted in increased
Russification for all of the groups. Whether or not the minority groups preferred to be assimi-
lated into the Russian culture or the culture of the republic differs from case to case.
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advantage, they also tended to gravitate toward Russian language
education.
Thus, Khrushchev made significant progress in. giving Russian its po-
sition of importance in the Soviet Union. He gave theoretical backing to
some of the steps made by Stalin, and began the promotion of Russian in
the schools through his educational reforms. Russian began to be viewed
as the language of all official business and, in effect, as the language of
the USSR.
This prominence was felt in all parts of the country, including the
Baltic republics. In the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, as it was then
called, Russian was required in all areas of life. "[A]ll official functions
were listed in Russian first, Estonian second. For many practical pur-
poses, such as calling an ambulance or reading recipes on food cans,
Russian quite simply reigned supreme." "' Russian was also the only lan-
guage of the military. 6
All three Baltic states had a significant percentage of minority ethnic
groups:
Table I 7













































285. GERNER & HEDLND, 
supra note 125, at 75.
286. See KARKLINS, supra 
note 114, at 116.
287. See Efron, supra note 
73, for ethnic and Russian 
population totals and percentages.
Population calculated from 
above figures. In Estonia 
there are 40,000 Ukrainians 
and 23,000
Byelorussians. See Estonians, 
Russians, and the Burden 
of History, supra note 
39. In Lithuania,
more than seven percent 
of the inhabitants are Polish. 





This data is even more compelling when compared to data taken during
the Soviet period. In Latvia, the proportion of Latvians fell from over
seventy-five percent in 1935 to under fifty-two percent in 1989."' The
Russian community rose from nine percent to over thirty-four percent
during that time.29 Seventy percent of Riga's residents have Russian as
their first or only language.m
In Estonia, from 1934 to 1989, the number of ethnic Estonians in the
population fell from 88.2 percent to 61.5 percent, while the number of
Russians grew from 8.2 percent to 30.3 percent.29' In both Latvia and Es-
tonia, Latvians and Estonians were minorities in many of their own
largest cities.f2 Thus, as a result of the policy of Russification, the Baltic
languages-and to some extent the national ethnic groups themselves-
found there very existence threatened. In order to reverse the over-
whelming influence of the Russian language, the newly independent
states had to enact laws to artificially counteract this and forcibly imposed
domination to reclaim their own languages.
B. A Legitimate Response to Russification: Prerogatives of
Statehood and the Quest for Cultural Independence
The Baltic laws focus on the promotion of the ethnic languages. The
language law of Estonia, for example, aims at promoting and strengthen-
ing the use of the Estonian language. 93 The goal of the laws, however, is
not to "Estonify" the Russians, but to make sure than the Estonian lan-
guage is not lost.
The justifications offered by the Baltic states have been accepted by
international organizations. The Secretary General of the United Nations
stated that:
Since the national identity of Estonians is intimately linked to
their language, which is not spoken anywhere else in the world, it
is important and legitimate for Estonians to give high priority to
the active use of the ,Estonian language in all spheres of activity
in Estonia. 94
288. See De Meyer & Rozakis, supra note 67, at 245.
289. See Krumm, supra note 69.
290. See Them and Us, supra note 22.
291. See International Body Tells Estonia to Lower Citizenship Hurdle, supra note 55.
292. See Statement ofArthur C. Helton, supra note 104.
293. See Pekkanen & Danelius, supra note 37, at 240-41.
294. DE VARENNES, supra note 10, at 245 (quoting Situation of Human Rights in Estonia
and Latvia-Report of the Secretary General 10 (United Nations Publications 1993)). However,
Professor de Varennes argues that some of the language laws may not be appropriate.
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Similarly, others who reviewed the language laws found that for the Bal-
tic states, "[p]art of the quest for independence involves a reassertion of
national control over language and culture.'' 9'
The laws in the Baltic states also do not violate international law. In-
ternational law extends its protections to various kinds of minorities,
including ethnic, racial, and, in some cases, linguistic minorities." Article
1(3) of the UN Charter states that it is the aim of the United Nations to
".. . encourag[e] respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language, or religion .... "
Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 98 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' provide freedom
from discrimination on the basis of language.3°° The UN General Assem-
bly also passed a resolution aimed at protecting the rights of ethnic,
religious, and linguistic minorities.'O However, it is a widely accepted
295. Eide, supra note 152, at 1330.
296. See, e.g., Barbara Mikolajczyk, Universal Protection of Minorities (Selected Prob-
lems), 20 POLIsH Y.B. OF INT'L L. 137 (1993) (discussing some specific problems in the
protection of minorities). See also Ryszard Cholewinski, State Duty Towards Ethnic Minorities.:
Positive or Negative?, 10 HUM, RTs. Q. 344 (1988) (arguing that under Article 27 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179, states
are under a positive duty to assist ethnic minorities in the preservation and development of their
culture, language, and religion).
297. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 (emphasis added). See also Joseph P. Gromacki, The
Protection of Language Rights in International Human Rights Law: A Proposed Draft Declara-
tion of Linguistic Rights, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 515, 532 (1992).
298. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810, at 71 (1948). See also Gromacki, supra note
297, at 533 (noting that "Article 2 of the Universal Declaration states that '[e]veryone is entitled
to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without discrimination of any kind,
such as race, color, sex, language, religion ...') (quoting G.A. Res. 217A (III), supra).
299. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
art.2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1976) [hereinafter International Covenant]. See also Gromacki, supra
note 297,at 535 (noting that the parties to the covenant "'undertake to guarantee that the rights
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion ...') (quoting International
Covenant, supra, art. 2(2)).
300. See generally Gromacki, supra note 297, at 515 (discussing language rights protec-
tion under international law).
301. See Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49 (1992)
[hereinafter Rights Declaration], reprinted in Advance Text of Resolutions and Decisions
adopted by the General Assembly at its 47th Session, Press Release GA/8470, Feb. 1, 1993, at
365 [hereinafter Resolutions of the 47th Session]. The resolution provides, inter alia, that
"[p]ersons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities ... have the right
to ... use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any
form of discrimination" Rights Declaration, supra, Annex, art. 2(1), reprinted in Resolutions of
the 47th Session, supra, at 367. The resolution further provides that "[n]o disadvantage shall
result for any person belonging to a minority as the consequence of the exercise or non-exercise
of the rights set forth in this Declaration" Rights Declaration, supra, Annex, art. 3(2), reprinted
in Resolutions of the 47th Session, supra, at 367.
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norm in international law that States are free to establish their own laws
on citizenship m0
The strongest arguments against the laws of the Baltic states have
been arguments stressing potential human rights violations."' One imme-
diate response to this criticism is that the citizenship and language laws of
the Baltic states have been reviewed by the UN, the Council of Europe,
the European Commission, and CSCE delegations.' The reviewers have
consistently found that the legislation does not violate human rights stan-
dards. °0 For example, a European human rights study found that
Lithuanian rules on citizenship did not violate any international stan-
dards.'3 In fact, even after Lithuania's independence, over forty thousand
Russians emigrated to Lithuania.w
Moreover, the Baltic states, unlike the Soviet Union, have tried to
protect linguistic minorities as much as they could.' All three states have
enacted legislation to protect linguistic minorities.09 The Latvian lan-
guage law was even found to grant a sufficient allowance for Russian as a
second language and to give extensive facilities to Russian-speakers.310
During the time of Soviet occupation, the international community argued
that the Baltic groups-and their culture and languages--deserved pro-
tection.3"' The laws that have been enacted try to do just that.
302. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 211, cmt. c (stating that "[a] state is free to establish nationality law and confer na-
tionality as it sees fit"). The Declaration itself provides that "[n]othing in this Declaration may
be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations, including ... territorial integrity and political independence of States" Rights Decla-
ration, supra note 301, Annex, art. 8(4), reprinted in Resolutions of the 47th Session, supra note
301, at 368. See also Pekkanen & Danelius, supra note 37, at 239 para. 35 (noting that "neither
the European Convention on Human Rights, nor any other international human rights conven-
tion recognizes the right to a certain citizenship as a human right").
303. See, e.g., Holzapfel, supra note 13. See generally supra text accompanying notes 70-
102.
304. See Fehervary, supra note 75, at 393. See also, e.g., Estonian CSCE Comments, supra
note 45; Pekkanen & Danelius, supra note 37.
305. See, e.g., Estonian CSCE Comments, supra note 45; Pekkanen & Danelius, supra
note 37.
306. See Pekkanen & Danelius, supra note 37, at 253 para. 31.
307. See id. at 254 para. 37.
308. See, e.g., FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ESTONIA,
LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA: COUNTRY STUDIES 33, 118, 205 (Walter R. Iwaskiw ed., 1996)
(indicating that all three Baltic governments permit linguistic minorities to pursue education in
their native languages).
309. See supra Part I (discussing Estonia, Latvian, and Lithuanian laws).
310. See Pekkanen & Danelius, supra note 37, at 248.
311. See e.g. Igor Grazin, supra note 152, at 1398 (noting that "[t]he acts aimed at the as-
similation of the Baltic ethnic groups into the Soviet Union and their sovietization justified their
claims for cultural and ethnic protection").
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Finally, to the extent that there has been a discriminatory effect on the
Russian community, that effect has been an unfortunate result of, and is
outweighed by, otherwise necessary---and legitimate-state goals. Soviet
laws lacked this legitimacy. First, the Soviet Union, unlike the Baltic
states, was not a State formed around a single ethnic identity. From its
beginning, it was a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual State and the imposition of
Russian on the many linguistic minorities was an artificial way to try to
blend the various cultures. The Baltic states have been formed around
ethnic identity and the international community has supported the promo-
tion of majority languages as national languages in the Baltic states as
legitimate. 12 Second, Russian was always a predominant language and
was not threatened with extinction. Russification was not a reclamation
effort, but rather an assimilationist one.
One argument often made against the language laws in the Baltic
states is that these states are also multi-ethnic and that the numbers of
Russians in those states requires more liberal language laws."' However,
the concern in the States is that since the national ethnic group constitutes
less than an overwhelming majority of the population, strict laws are nec-
essary in order to prevent the loss of the ethnic and linguistic heritage.
14
The laws have also varied by State according to how much protection was
needed. Lithuania, for example, was able to have looser citizenship laws
because Lithuanians constituted a majority of the population."' At the
same time, the Lithuanian Constitution focuses on the protection of the
Lithuanian language."'
Of course, promotion of the ethnic languages has not been without a
price. Russian flight, less of a concern in the Baltics where greater per-
centages of the native populations are professionals such as doctors and
engineers, has been a concern in the other states. The States have also had
312. See Pekkanen & Danelius, supra note 37, at 241 para. 50, 51 (noting however, in ref-
erence to Estonia's language law, that it is questionable whether it is permissible for the
legislature to enact provisions governing the activities of "firms, institutions and organizations").
At the same time, promotion of a majority language must be done so as to ensure that members
of linguistic minorities are not at a substantial disadvantage in their with the authorities. See id.
at 241 para. 50.
313. For example, Professor de Varennes argues that the citizenship laws in Latvia and
Estonia do not take into account the large number of Russian speakers in those states and the
difficulty many of them will face in trying to learn Russian. See DE VARENNES, supra note 10,
at 244-247.
314. See generally Hiatt, supra note 85 (noting that "many Estonians worr[y] that their
culture and language, suppressed for 50 years, would be buried by unfavorable demographics").
In Latvia, debates about the various draft citizenship laws revealed the concern that granting
blanket citizenship rights might result in the Latvians becoming a minority in their own country.
See Bridge, supra note 67.
315. See supra Table 1.
316. LrrH. CONST. preamble.
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to risk strong opposition from Russia. But, the slight cost to the Russian
language is deemed to be worth enhancing and reviving the national lan-
guages in the Baltic states.
C. Reclaiming the National Languages in All of the
Post-Soviet States 
317
Baltic language laws do not severely differ from those in other post-
Soviet states. For example, the Constitution of Moldova adopts
"Moldovan" as the official language. 8 The Russian minority in Moldova
is concentrated in the province of Transdnestr.3 9 With strong prompting
from Russia leadership in Moscow, the Russians in Transdnestr have ar-
gued for secession from Moldova because they are subject to language
discrimination by the Moldovan authorities.3 2 The Russian minority in
Moldova anticipated problems even before Moldova became independent
and protested about its possible future mistreatment.
3 2
However, prior to Moldova's independence, it was subject to the same
policies of Russification. Soviet authorities required that Moldovan be
written in the Cyrillic alphabet to emphasize that it was not Romanian. 22
This policy was designed to cut the strong linguistic and historical links
between Moldova and Romania.123 Moldovan is virtually identical to Ro-
manian.2' Like the Baltics, Moldova has justified its promotion of
Moldovan by noting the legacy of the Soviet policies."z
In the parts of Moldova where Russians are prevalent, struggles to re-
claim the Moldovan language offer further justification for the language
laws. For example, in the Dnestr region, teachers went on strike when
regional authorities required that lessons be taught using the Cyrillic
317. This focuses on the post-Soviet states other than Russia.
318. CONsTrrUTA REPUBuCII MOLDAVA [Constitution] art. 13 (Mold.), reprinted and
translated in 12 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1996) (declaring that "Moldovan;' written in the Latin alphabet, shall be
the national language, but acknowledging "the right to preserve, develop and use the Russian
language and any other language").
319. See Jonathan Eyal, A Border War We Filed Away, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON),
Feb. 10, 1994, at 23.
320. See id
321. See Sunley, supra note 96.
322. See King, supra note 8, at 61.
323. See Eyal, supra note 319.
324. See King, supra note 8, at 60-61 (comparing Moldovan and Romanian to American
English and British English).
325. See John Quigley, Towards International Norms on Linguistic Rights: The Russian-
Romanian Controversy in Moldova, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 69, 81-82 (1994) (including an in-
depth discussion of the history and status of Moldovan language policies). This is the same
justification used by the Baltic states. See supra text accompanying notes 103-106.
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script. 2 The local Russian authorities in Dnestr even refused to fund
Moldovan language schools."'
Similarly, Ukranian is the official language of Ukraine.3 2 In the
largely Ukrainian city of Lviv (in west Ukraine), the city council even
decided to stop enrolling students in the city's last Russian-language
class. ' "
In Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani is the official state language.33° Russians in
Azerbaijan have demanded a referendum on declaring Russian to be a
second state language. 31 The president of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibei,
has been concerned over the flight of Russian specialists from Azerbai-
jan. 2 The number of Russians in Azerbaijan has dropped from over
500,000 in 1989 to 200,000 in 1994.2"3
The Russian minority in Azerbaijan constitutes three to five percent
of the population.33' The president of Azerbaijan was among the first
leaders of the newly formed states to issue a decree that protected the
rights of ethnic minorities and supported the development of minority
languages. 35 However, the Azerbaijani language is being rapidly intro-
326. See Romanian-Language School in Dniester Suspends Strike, OMRI Daily Digest,
Oct. 8, 1996 (visited Nov. 13, 1997) <http://search.omri.cz/bin/omri.acgi$main_search>. This
was contentious because the Romanian speaking Moldovans use the Latin script, whereas the
Russian minority in that region uses the Cyrillic script.
327. See Chisinau, liraspol Deadlocked on "Moldovan-Language," OMRI Daily Digest,
Sept. 29, 1995 (visited Nov. 13, 1997) <http://search.omri.cz/bin/omri.acgi$mainsearch>.
328. See KONST1TUTSIA UKRAINIY [Constitution] art. 7 (Ukr.), reprinted and translated
in 20 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H.
Flanz eds., 1994). However, in heavily Russian eastern Ukraine, Russians voted to make Rus-
sian a second language. See Moldova Puts Off Language Testing, UPI, Apr. 2, 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
329. See Socialists Protest End to Russian-Language Schooling in Lviv, OMRI Daily Di-
gest, Sept. 6, 1995 (visited Nov. 13, 1997) <http://search.omri.cz/bin/omri.acgi$main search>.
The head of the Lviv education department even threatened to resign if Kiev ordered Lviv to
renew enrollment. However, members of the Socialist party of Ukraine went on strike to protest
the end of the Russian-language classes. Id.
330. KONSTrrUTSIIA AZERBAIDZHANSKOI RESPUBLIKI [Constitution] art. 21 (Azer.), re-
printed and translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Booklet 2, 1996). See Ali Naibov, If You Don't Know The
Language, Pack Up and Go, RUSSIAN PRESS DIGEST, Jan. 16, 1993, available in 1993 WL
10469517.
331. See, e.g., Russians in Azerbaijan Want Russian as Second State Language, OMRI
Daily Digest, Sept. 28, 1995 (visited Nov. 13, 1997) <http://search.omri.cz/bin/omri/
acgi$main_search>. If this passes, this would be similar to the Kyrgyz provision.
332. See, e.g., id
333. Id.
334. See Naibov, supra note 330 (estimating the Russian minority as five percent); Susan
Sachs, Central Asia's Awakening, NEWSDAY (NEW YORK), Sept. 7, 1997, at A6, available in
Lexis, News Library, Curnws File (estimating the Russian minority as three percent).
335. See Naibov, supra note 330.
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duced in all areas of public life.336 This is despite the fact that, unlike the
Baltic situation, it is very difficult to study Azerbaijan since there are not
enough manuals or language courses."'
Unlike Azerbaijan, some of the post-Soviet states have made a slight
concession to make Russian a second language. For example, in Belarus,
Belarusian is the official language.33 However, the Russian language is
also constitutionally safeguarded.339
Kazakhstan has adopted Kazakh as its official language but has al-
lowed Russian to occupy an "equal ground" with Kazakh in state and
local administrative bodies.' ° Therefore, Kazakh is not necessary for offi-
cial purposes. Many ethnic Kazakhs argued that it was necessary to
make Kazakh the official state language without sharing constitutional
protection with Russian. 4 The Russians in Kazakhstan protested, arguing
that even many Kazakhs could not read or write in their own language
and that it would be chaotic to have this become the main language over-
night.M3' The Russian minority in Kazakhstan also complained that
Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has given the best jobs to the
Kazakh majority and has denied Russians proper representation.4
In Kyrgyzstan, where the Kyrgyz just barely constitute a majority of
the population,34 5 Kyrgyz is the state language. 4' The Constitution also
provides for the "preservation, equal and free development and function-
ing of the Russian language."'37 This amendment was intended to have a
336. l
337. Id
338. See KONSTrrUTSiiA RESPUBLIKI BELARUS' [Constitution] art. 17 (Belr.), reprinted
and translated in 2 CONsTrrUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1997).
339. Id.
340. See KAZ CONST. art. 7.
341. See Stephen Kanter, Constitution Making in Kazakhstan, 5 SPG INT'L LEGAL PERSP.
65, 77 (1993).
342. See id. (noting that the ethnic Kazakhs felt that it was "important to reassert Kazakh
sovereignty and nationalism after years of Soviet domination and that language was a crucial
symbol in this regard").
343. See id The use of the Kazakh language had significantly declined during the Soviet
period.
344. See Alan Philps, Kazakhstan: Western Aid, Asian Role-Models, Vast Kazakhstan in
One More Name in the Confision Roll-Call of Former Soviet Vassal States, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Mar. 21, 1994, available in 1995 WL 11336507.
345. See supra Table 1.
346. See KONsTrruTsuiA KYRGYZSKOI RESPUBLIKI [Constitution] art. 5 (Kyrg.), re-
printed and translated in 10 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1994).
347. Id art 5(2).
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two-fold effect: to stop the flight of the Russians out of that State and to
facilitate ties with Commonwealth of Independent States countries. 8
However, despite the slight symbolic concessions made in some
states toward Russian, the leaders of all the former Soviet republics have
been united on their freedom to dictate their own civil laws, including
language laws, free from Russian interference?' 9 At a meeting in Ukraine
in 1993, leaders met to denounce Moscow's pledge to protect Russians
who find themselves in the newly independent states. 5°
At this meeting, even Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev who is
normally pro-Russian, compared Russian protection of Russians in the
post-Soviet states with Hitler's justification of his invasion of the Czecho-
slovakian Sudetenland. 5' Even the most pro-Russian State, Belarus,
objected to the Russian position.352 Thus, all the States have agreed on the
basic idea that promotion of their national languages is an essential part of
reclaiming their culture and gaining cultural independence.
CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE LAWS
Between 1953 and 1963, Khrushchev enacted language policies that
were meant to "merge" the nations of the USSR. Since he did this in
conjunction with his other, more liberal policies, the important question
arises of why a "reformer" had to engage in language policies of Russifi-
cation. The simplest answer to this question is that, for the Soviet Union,
any leader who attempted to change Soviet society and allow for greater
freedoms would immediately uncover a torrent of ethnic sentiment. Since
one of the most important aspects of maintaining power was keeping the
Soviet Union together, it became necessary to hold back ethnic expres-
sion, or even attempt to change national identity. This was not necessary
for Lenin or Stalin since they both had strong control over the govern-
ment. Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chemenko continued most of
348. See Referendum on Russian Language to be Held in Kyrgyzstan, OMRI Daily Digest,
Nov. 27, 1995 (visited Nov. 13, 1997) <http://search.omri.cz/bin/omri/acgi$mainsearch>.
349. See Republics Lash Russian Vow of Ethnic Solidarity, supra note 74.
350. See id. Then foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev had said the Moscow would "protect
the Russian population and Russia's interests in a tough manner, wherever it is needed and who-
ever is concerned, even if it be our friends." ld.
351. See id.
352. See id. A Belarus leader stated that "[n]o one here need be defended by Russia. Eve-
ryone in Belarus has full civil rights regardless of nationality." d. Similar statements were made
by officials from Georgia, Uzbekistan, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova and Ukraine. Id.
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Khrushchev's language policies, not necessarily because they were re-
forming the society, but because they needed to maintain their power"
Thus, one of the main lessons of Khrushchev's language policy is that
a liberal language policy is often incompatible with other liberal domestic
policies, at least in a multilingual State without a unifying ethnic identity.
The Soviet Union, though a more Russified State since Khrushchev's
time, continued to have a multitude of languages and nationalities. The
Orwellian inequality in language status permeated Soviet society and
continues to be felt in the newly independent states. And in many ways
this inequality was started by a "reformer's" policy of "sliianie."
The irony of Khrushchev's reign also explains why language laws are
so important. As noted earlier, it is nearly impossible for any leader to
actually change "ethnic identity." When, as in the USSR and many other
states, language and ethnicity are so closely linked, language policy can
be used as a weapon against ethnic identity. For the Baltic states this
meant that languages and ethnic cultures were threatened with extinction
through the policy of Russification.
At the same time, the current laws of the Baltic states show that lan-
guage laws can be used to strengthen and reclaim language and culture.
The leaders of the Baltic states must address various concerns including
strengthening their newly independent states, reversing the policies of the
Soviet Union and establishing a cohesive and efficient state structure. At
the forefront is the need to reestablish their linguistic and cultural identity.
Some of the older citizens recall the independent period. Even those
born during Soviet occupation of the Baltics may remember the national
language as their "language of lullabies." However, the Soviet legacy
erased much of that culture. The language laws of the Baltic states are a
necessary and timely means of getting it back.
353. It is tempting at this point to add that Gorbachev allowed for greater freedoms, and
during his reign the Soviet Union ceased to exist. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union was
due to a variety of factors and is far too complex to be explained away in a footnote.
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